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Abstract: 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaty’s effects on FDI and the domestic business environment remain unexplored 
despite the proliferation of treaties over the past several years.  This paper asks whether BITs stimulate 
FDI flows to host countries, and if the treaties have any impact on the environment for domestic 
private investment.  We find a weak relationship between BITs and FDI.  However, for risky 
countries, BITs attract greater amounts of FDI.  We also find a weak relationship between BITs 
and the domestic investment environment.  Thus, while BITs may not alter the domestic 
investment environment, they also may not be fulfilling their primary objective. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The impact of multinational firms on developing countries is one of the most hotly contested 
issues in the current debate over globalization.  Much has been written about the macro-
economic impact of foreign investment.  Our interest goes beyond these macroeconomic 
implications to focus on the political and social effects of foreign direct investment (FDI).  Our 
general interest is in the decision-making processes of both foreign investors and host 
governments.  Although these processes are complex and multi-faceted, our focus in this paper is 
on the role of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), an instrument of growing importance as 
emerging economies seek to attract foreign investment. This study of BITs is part of our ongoing 
attempt to understand how foreign investors’ and host countries’ efforts to limit risk affect the 
domestic business environment. 
 
Investors always face risks because changes in market prices and opportunities cannot be 
perfectly predicted ex ante.  However, in many developing countries the risk goes beyond 
ordinary market risk. Investors may have little trust in the reliability and fairness of property 
rights and government enforcement, and conversely, local businesses, citizens, and politicians 
may have little confidence in the motives and staying power of international business. Investors 
complain that the rules are unclear and variable over time. Critics in the host country worry that 
international investors will reap most of the gains and will flee at the first sign of trouble.  In the 
extreme, the distrust on both sides can be so large that little or no investment takes place, even 
when this investment would be beneficial to both parties.  
 
Foreign direct investment has frequently been studied as if it were an undifferentiated mass of 
capital that moves around the world in response to domestic conditions in host countries. We 
agree that investment is affected by domestic conditions, but we argue that it should be analyzed 
as a series of deals between host countries and foreign firms that may involve input from the 
firm’s home country as well. Especially in poor and emerging economies, FDI frequently takes 
the form of large projects each one of which represents a sizable share of the host country’s total 
investment. Therefore, so long as the foreign investor has alternative potential sites for its 
investment, it has bargaining power vis à vis the host country’s government and may be able to 
negotiate terms that are more favorable than those available to domestic investors. These terms 
may take the form of exemptions from certain local laws, including tax laws, and of special 
subsidies and public services, such as new roads and upgraded port facilities. In addition, foreign 
investors may worry about being exploited by the host country after their investments are sunk 
and will seek assurances that the government will not treat them worse than domestic firms. 
 
In recent years international investors have been aided by the growth of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs).  These are treaties signed between the home countries of investors and potential 
host countries that set a general framework for the negotiation of FDI deals. They bind the host 
country to treat all foreign investors from the home country in ways that will protect their 
investments and that give them either parity with or advantages over domestic investors.  
 
The popularity of BITs suggests that many investors are not confident about the legal and 
political environment in low and middle-income countries. Given this fact, host countries believe 
they will benefit from signing a treaty that seems on its face quite one-sided in favor of foreign   3 
investors.  The policy questions are then two-fold. First, do BITs stimulate FDI flows to the host 
country? If the answer to this question is positive, do the treaties encourage certain types of FDI 
more than others?  Second, what is the impact of BITs on the environment for domestic private 
investment? Is domestic investment stimulated or discouraged by an aggressive effort to sign 
BITs with many potential investment partners?  In other words, is FDI a substitute or a 
complement for domestic investment, and do BITs encourage countries to improve the protection 
of domestic property rights? 
 
If countries concentrate on making special deals with foreign direct investors, we speculate that 
they might neglect measures that improve the investment climate overall.  One could study this 
problem at the level of individual deals to see if their terms permit multinationals to opt out of 
restrictive local rules or to get better protections from costly government policies. This is an 
important research priority, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on BITS, 
the one generic policy that clearly singles out foreign direct investors and consider their effects. 
However, we realize that our results will not be definitive. BITs are a relatively new 
phenomenon in international business, and their impact is only beginning to be felt. 
 
We proceed as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of the growth and impact of FDI on 
low and moderate income countries and discusses its relationship to domestic property rights.  
Section III is an introduction to BITs.  Section IV discusses our empirical results. Section V 
concludes. 
 
II.  Foreign Direct Investment, and Domestic Property Rights  
 
Both theory and empirical evidence provide mixed results on the benefits versus the costs of 
FDI.  On one side of the debate, scholars suggest that FDI brings new technology and production 
techniques, raises wages, improves management skills and quality control, and enhances access 
to export markets.
2  Some of the costs include stifling of domestic competition and indigenous 
entrepreneurship, increased income inequality, lower public revenues, an appreciation of the 
exchange rate and a continuing reliance on local resource endowments, rather than 
modernization of the productive sector of the economy.  Characteristics of the host country—
such as human capital, labor and wage standards, and the distribution of existing technology 
across countries, will affect how much countries benefit (or lose) from foreign investment 
opportunities (World Bank and UNCTAD data sources, Lall and Streeten (1977), Lankes and 
Venables (1996), Kofele-Kale (1992), and Blomstrom et al. (1996)). 
 
Both the type of FDI and the mode of entry affect FDI’s impact on host countries. The existing 
empirical work has only begun to sort out these complexities.  In our view, the inconclusive 
results arise because the precise impact of FDI varies between industries and countries 
depending on the characteristics of countries and their policies.
3 Its impact also depends upon the 
precise nature of the deal that is struck between the investor, the host country, and any joint 
venture partners. 
 
                                                 
2 For overviews of the theory of the influence of FDI on technology transfer see Caves (1996), Findlay (1978), 
Mansfield and Romeo (1980), Koizumi and Kopecky(1980), Klein et al. (2001), Cooper (2001), and Hanson (2001) 
3 Lankes and Venables (1996), Kofele-Kale (1992), Blomstrom et al (1992).    4 
In poor, high-risk environments FDI is likely to be the major source of investment funds. 
Regardless of the inconclusive results concerning the pros and cons of FDI, low and middle-
income countries view it as a primary means for increased economic growth.   Thus, host country 
governments work to attract FDI.  They offer incentives to multinational corporations (MNCs) 
designed to attract FDI from competing countries and to offset potential risk factors that might 
deter investment.  Likewise, MNCs employ strategies to reduce the potential risk of investing in 
unstable environments. 
 
Over the period 1995-2000, FDI inflows grew at an annual average rate of 17 per cent for low 
and middle-income countries.
4  Although inflows of FDI to such countries continue to grow 
yearly, their share of world FDI flows recently began to decline.  FDI inflows to developing 
countries grew from US$187 billion in 1997 to $240 billion in 2000, although their share of 
world FDI decreased to 19 per cent in 2000 down from 21 per cent in 1999 and 27 per cent in 
1998 (figure 1a and 1b).
5  FDI continues to be the largest source of external finance for 
developing countries, exceeding the sum of commercial bank loans and portfolio flows in most 
years (figure 2).  It is also more stable than financing from other external sources. Between 1997 
and 2001, FDI was relatively flat as a share of the GDP of developing countries, but the ratio 
between FDI and non-FDI flows varied from 4.6 to 1.8.  
 
[Insert figures 1a, 1b, and 2 here] 
 
There are two principal ways to attract FDI, which may be complements or substitutes. The first 
is to establish special, favorable conditions for FDI that do not apply to all investment; the 
second is to improve the overall political\economic environment to reduce risk.  One way to 
reduce risk is to have clearly defined and enforced property rights. Well enforced property rights  
not only leads to greater amounts of current domestic investment,
6 but also creates a stable 
                                                 
4 FDI inflows are defined as the gross level of FDI flowing into a region over a period of time (usually one year).  
FDI stock is defined as the total accumulated value of foreign owned assets at a given point in time. Developing 
countries are defined according to the World Bank’s income classifications, based on gross national income (GNI) 
per capita. The category ‘Developing countries’ includes low-income, lower-middle income, and upper-middle 
income countries.  See appendix A for exact classifications. 
5 All dollar figures are in constant 2000 US dollars. 
6 Douglas North (1990) argues that inefficient property rights are “the most important source of both historical 
stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.” Hernando De Soto (2000) claims that property 
rights help people to borrow more easily and overcome the information constraints that enable markets to function 
efficiently.  In Firmin-Seller’s (1995) study of property right in Ghana, she found that the key to the state's economic 
success lay in the ability of the government to enforce property rights through its political institutions.  Knack and 
Keefer (1995) offer evidence that “institutions that protect property rights are crucial to economic growth and 
investment.” Likewise, Goldsmith (1995), using cross-sectional data found a correlation between property rights and 
economic growth in low and middle-income countries.  In a firm level study of political risk in developing countries, 
Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1993) found that “if political uncertainty is present, economically sound domestic 
investments are rare…institutional reform is therefore a crucial precondition for market-driven development that 
depends primarily on private sector investment.”  Torstensson (1994) found that “insecure property rights result in 
an inefficient allocation of investment funds and an inefficient use of human capital.”  Taking into account the time 
dimension of economic growth, David Leblang demonstrated that nations that protect property rights grow faster 
than those that do not.  Stepping back to look at overall policies that affect not only overall growth, but also the 
incomes of the poor, Dollar and Kraay (2001) found that basic packages of good policies, within which property 
rights plays a vital role, raise overall incomes in developing countries and have an additional positive impact on the   5 
market environment that can promote FDI.  Confidence in the enforcement of property rights 
reduces the incentive to insure against political risk and reduces the cost of doing business 
(Abbott 2000). Studies on corruption and political risk show that foreign investors prefer to do 
business in environments with well-enforced property rights.
7   
 
If strong property rights are desirable for both domestic and foreign investors, why don’t 
countries simply replicate the property rights systems of western capitalist societies?  One reason 
is that most developing country governments do not have the legal systems and institutional 
structures in place to adequately enforce laws. In other cases, it is simply not in the best interests 
of governments to create or enforce strong property rights. Such governments cannot make 
credible commitments not to violate their own country’s rules.  It is only when the benefits of 
property rights enforcement outweigh the benefits of low levels of enforcement that governments 
will strengthen enforcement.
8  Governments in countries with weak property rights may seek to 
attract FDI by making special deals with investors that do not have to be extended to the 
domestic economy as a whole, or even undermine domestic protections.
9  
 
 
III.  Bilateral Investment Treaties   
   
Given the weakness of the domestic political\legal environment in many low and middle-income 
countries, investors seek alternatives tailored to their needs. This can be done on a case-by-case 
basis, but transaction costs can be reduced if the host country commits itself to a basic 
framework. This is what BITs do. They provide clear, enforceable rules to protect foreign 
investment and reduce the risk faced by investors. According to UNCTAD’s comprehensive 
overview of BITs, the treaties promote foreign investment through a series of strategies, 
including guarantees of a high standard of treatment, legal protection of investment under 
international law, and access to international dispute resolution (UNCTAD 1998). They are 
becoming a more and more popular tool for developing countries to promote and protect foreign 
investment.   
 
The first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan and entered into force in 1962.  
The number of new BITs concluded rose rapidly in the 1990s.   According to UNCTAD, the 
overall number of BITs rose from 385 in 1990 to 1,857 at the end of 1999.  As of the end of 
1999, 173 countries were involved in bilateral investment treaties (figure 3).   Most early treaties 
were signed between a developed and a developing country, generally at the urging of the 
developed country governments.  Typically, before the 1990s, developing countries did not sign 
BITs with each other, but throughout the 1990s more and more developing countries have been 
signing the treaties with each other (figure 4). 
                                                                                                                                                             
incomes of the poor.  Likewise, Hall and Jones (1999) found that differences in government policy and institutions, 
with property rights playing a major role, equated to large differences in income across countries.   
7 Although a number of authors have hypothesized this link, Anderson’s studies of corruption in Eastern Europe 
confirm the relationship.  See for example, Anderson et al (2003) and Anderson (1998, 2000).   See also Goldsmith 
(1995), LeBlang (1996), and Grabowski and Shields (1996). 
8 See Barzel (1989) and Firmin-Sellers (1995).
 Borner et al (1995) confirms Firmin-Sellers finding in their study of 
property rights and investment in Ghana. 
9 For example, Hernando De Soto argues that without clear ownership, land can be stripped from the poor to make 
way for government and foreign-led industrialization projects (De Soto 2000).   6 
 
The proliferation of BITs has followed a general geographic pattern.  Most early BITs were 
signed between African and Western European Countries.  Asian nations slowly began to enter 
the arena in the 1970s, followed by central and eastern European countries. It was not until the 
late 1980s that Latin American nations began to enter into these agreements (figure 5).
10   
 
 
A.  BITs: History 
 
International law on commerce and investment originally developed out of a series of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation treaties (FCNs) and their European equivalents. They were part of 
the US Marshall Plan that was meant to reinvigorate the European economy after World War II.   
FCNs provided foreign investors with most favored nation treatment in host countries, but were 
mainly signed between developed countries.  The United States also attempted to protect foreign 
investors through investment guarantees and legal provisions.  The Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) was established to protect investment in postwar Europe and was expanded 
to developing countries in 1959.  Further, the U.S. Congress passed the Hickenlooper 
amendment requiring the U.S. government to terminate aid to any country that expropriated 
property from a U.S. investor without adequate compensation.  The amendment was used only 
twice and did not serve its purpose in deterring investment (Mckinstry Robin 1984).   
 
In 1967, the OECD attempted to establish a multilateral agreement on foreign investment 
protection—the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.  The convention 
proposed an international minimum standard of protection for foreign investment but was 
opposed by developing countries, mainly in Latin America, that insisted on subjecting foreign 
investment to domestic control with disputes being settled in domestic courts.
11  Following the 
failure of the OECD convention, European countries and later the United States began to 
establish more and more bilateral investment agreements with developing countries.
12   
 
 
  B. BITs: Basic Provisions 
Overall, the provisions of BITs are meant to secure the legal environment for foreign investors, 
establish mechanisms for dispute resolution, and facilitate the entry and exit of funds.  BITs 
cover expropriation of property as well as indirect takings that are tantamount to expropriation.  
BITs are currently the dominant means through which investment in low and middle income 
countries is regulated under international law (Kishoiyian 1994, Schwarzenberger 1969, Walker 
                                                 
10 Although Latin American countries were not signatories to BITs until the 1990s, their largest trading partner, the 
United States, provided political risk insurance and guarantee agreements to most Latin American Nations. 
11 In 1974, a number of developing countries supported a United Nations resolution to protect the national 
sovereignty of the economic activities and resources of host countries (Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.31) at 50, 51-55, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)). 
12 European treaties are generally known as Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements (BIPAs) although the U.S. 
treaties are known as BITs.  The United States Bilateral Investment Treaty program did not begin until 1982 with its 
treaty with Panama.  The United States signed twenty-three FCNs between 1946 and 1966, but did not enter into any 
other bilateral agreements on investment until the 1982 BIT with Panama.  Shenkin (1994) attributes this to a 
reluctance on the part of developing countries to enter into FCNs with the United States as well as the attractiveness 
of the European BIPA program.   7 
1956).   The treaties are a response to the weaknesses of customary international law under 
which foreign investment is subject exclusively to the territorial sovereignty of the host country 
(UNCTAD 1998). 
 
The majority of BITs
13 have very similar provisions.  The major differences lie in the protection 
or non-protection of certain types of investment.  The need for developing countries to retain 
control over certain types of investments and resources restricts the establishment of an 
international agreement on investment.   
 
As with their predecessors, the FCNs, BITs provide national or most-favored-nation treatment to 
foreign investors in the host country.  However, most BITs contain clauses that exclude 
investments in particular areas such as national security, telecommunications, and finance.  
National treatment ensures foreign investors the right to establish any business that the host 
government would have allowed a domestic investor to establish.  National treatment is not 
followed in all BITs.  Some limit treatment to that considered “fair and equitable,” although 
some require that all foreign investments gain approval regardless of the domestic situation 
(McKinstry Robin 1984).  Further, the US model treaty as well as many European BITs establish 
the right of the investor to transfer all earnings to the investing country. 
 
BITs generally provide for resolution of investor-host country disputes by the World Bank 
Group's International Center for the Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID) as a 
background provision (UNCTAD, 1998).  In spite of these provisions, official sanctions against 
countries not complying with BITs tend to be weak.  However, violations of these treaties should 
result in future reluctance of both the partner country and new countries to sign further treaties, 
loss of faith in existing treaties, and lack of faith in the investment environment in the host 
country. Thus, although only a small number of investment disputes have been heard by ICSID, 
hundreds of disputes are negotiated between interested parties because of the binding nature of 
ICSID arbitration (Shenkin 1994). 
 
Typically, developed countries prepare a model treaty based on the 1967 Draft Convention on 
the Protection of Foreign Property and on already existing BITs (UNCTAD 1996).
14  These 
model treaties are then modified for use in a variety of situations.  Thus, treaties emanating from 
a developed country are likely to be similar or even identical, but differences exist between those 
proposed by different developed countries.  The principal aim of the treaties is to outline the host 
country obligations to the investors of the home country. 
 
 
C.  The Impact of BITs on Developing Countries  
 
1.  Costs and Benefits of BITs 
                                                 
13 We will use BIT to refer to both BITs and BIPAs.   The main difference between BITs and BIPAs is the 
prohibition in BITs of investment performance requirements. 
14  For an example of a model treaty see Appendix B, 1994 US draft treaty. 
 
   8 
Developing countries employ BITs as a means to attract inward investment. The protections to 
foreign investment are presumed to attract investment flows to developing countries that will 
lead to economic development.  Developing countries hope that the treaties signal to foreign 
investors either a strong protective investment environment or a commitment that foreign 
investments will be protected through international enforcement of the treaty. 
 
Beyond attracting investment, developing countries hope that BITs will have peripheral benefits.  
For example, binding foreign investment disputes to international arbitration may serve not only 
as a signal that the current government is friendly towards FDI, but it may also lock future 
governments into the same policy stance.    Further, BITs may provide symbolic benefits to the 
current government.  For example, signing a BIT may signal a willingness to sign international 
treaties in other areas.  For countries in transition, BITs may provide a shortcut to policy 
credibility in the international arena (Martin and Simmons 2002). 
 
These benefits must be balanced against the costs.  Although developing countries may enter into 
the treaties in the hopes of obtaining peripheral benefits, some countries may be forced to sign 
the treaties to compete with similar countries.   For example, if two countries offer relatively 
similar investment environments and one signs a BIT with a major foreign investor, the other 
country may agree to sign a similar treaty—regardless of the potentially negative impacts of that 
treaty—simply to remain on par with the competing country. 
 
BITs may facilitate a division of profits that is less favorable than might occur under other 
regimes less highly controlled by the developed countries. They may also have negative 
consequences for domestic investors if they are treated less well relative to foreign investors. 
MNCs argue that BITs only level the playing field for them relative to favored domestic 
investors, but it is at least possible that the scales may end up tilted in favor of the foreign 
investors.  
 
Developing countries fear a loss of control over their internal economic activity through 
restrictions on their employment and development policies as well as through challenges to 
national industries.  The loss of sovereignty over domestic investment disputes may be too high a 
burden for some developing countries and lead them to refuse to sign BITs (Kahler 2000).  In the 
early 1980s, the US BIT with Honduras was stalled for a few years because clauses in the draft 
treaty violated Honduran legislation.  For example, in 1984, Honduras was counting on US$5 
billion of US investment, but refused to sign the BIT because of the sovereignty issues at stake.
15 
 
The US BITs and several European BITs prohibit investment performance requirements.  
Although this may lead to an end of a race to the bottom to attract investment in terms of tax 
holidays or other incentives, it may also take away from the host country leverage over foreign 
investors.  Investment performance requirements enable host countries to influence the trading 
and locational decisions of foreign investors in favor of host country development.   For 
example, export requirements can improve the balance of payments accounts of a host country 
and locational incentives can aid the infrastructure development of the host country.  The costs 
versus the benefits of the removal of investment incentives have yet to be studied, but the loss of 
                                                 
15 Torres, Manuel.  “Honduras: Trade Talks With U.S. At Standstill.”  Inter Press Service, April 3, 1984.   9 
performance requirements may mean the loss of a key benefit of FDI for developing countries 
(Shenkin 1994). 
 
A claim of expropriation under a BIT may be resolved through a judgment that requires the host 
country to pay compensation to the investor. In the absence of BITs, developed countries push 
for application of their own legal guidelines for “prompt, adequate and effective compensation,” 
and developing countries have long insisted that only host countries’ domestic tribunals can 
decide upon appropriate compensation.  BITs protect investments from developed countries with 
violations subject to dispute resolution through ICISD (Kishoiyian 1994).   
 
Repatriation of profits is another area that may have negative consequences for developing 
countries.  The majority of treaties grant the investor the ability to repatriate profits “without 
undue delay”.  At the same time, many of the treaties guarantee the host country the ability to 
delay the repatriation of profits in times of economic emergency.
 16  If the treaties are interpreted 
to give a narrow reading to the term “economic emergency,” the ability to repatriate profits could 
intensify liquidity problems faced by host countries (Kishoyian 1994, McKinstry Robin 1984).  
This issue may arise in the case of the French-Argentinean BIT.  Suez, a French water and 
energy firm that has invested in Argentina, is suing the government of Argentina under the 
expropriation provisions of their BIT for compensatory damages following the devaluation of the 
peso.  Although this case is still pending, the validity of the claim under the BIT is worrisome for 
the economic situation in Argentina.
17 
 
Nearly all BITs contain clauses that give firms the right to petition governments for damages 
stemming from environmental or health regulations enacted after investment has taken place.  
Firms have successfully sued for damages under an equivalent clause in NAFTA.  Specifically, 
firms have been able to claim that newly enacted environmental and health regulations amount to 
the expropriation of profits.  A Spanish waste management firm has brought about such a case.  
Tecnicas Medioambientales SA, is suing the Mexican government under the provisions of the 
Spain-Mexico BIT for damages resulting from new environmental regulations. The result of this 
type of clause may keep governments that have signed BITs from enacting new environmental, 
health, or labor regulation for fear that they could be sued under existing BITs.
18 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, is the issue of dispute settlement.  
Foreign investors have recourse to international arbitration tribunals to settle any claims resulting 
from what they believe to be unfair treatment of their property.  Domestic investors are left to the 
property rights enforcement systems that developed country investors can avoid through BITs. 
 
2.  Property Rights and BITs 
 
                                                 
16 Kishoiyian(1994) points to an ICSID study of 335 BITs. All provided for the immediate repatriation of profits, 
but 60 enabled the host country to take into account its balance of payments situation in the country, and many 
provided for interest or set the precise rate of exchange in the event of a delay. 
17 EFE News Service,  June 28, 2002.   France-Argentina French Firm To Press Argentina For Indemnization On 
Losses. 
18 Peterson, Luke.  “Opinion Debate Over Investor Rights Is Too Late.”  The Toronto Star.  April 22, 2001.   10 
Given the mixed impact of BITs, we would expect that low and middle-income countries will 
vary in their enthusiasm for BITs and in their insistence on the inclusion of exceptions.  For 
example, resource rich countries have an advantage in bargaining with foreign investors.  
Therefore, we would expect resource rich states to try to avoid signing such treaties or to sign 
treaties with favorable clauses; in contrast, states with few distinctive benefits to offer investors 
need to sign BITs (Kahler 2000 and Abbott 2000).  Countries competing for the same types of 
investment need to mimic the policies of competing countries, or they risk placing themselves at 
a disadvantage.  Thus, we would expect that if one country signs a BIT as a signal to foreign 
investors that their investments will be protected, this will encourage similar countries to act 
likewise. 
 
Weak countries may sign BITs to constrain stronger states, but in the process they must accept a 
deal that is very favorable to the stronger state. Only risk-takers will invest in countries such as 
Somalia, the Congo and Tanzania; these investors are likely mainly to care about natural 
resources, thus overall domestic investment remains minimal.  Even if these countries signed 
BITs, it is unlikely that investors would rely on the treaties to assure investment protections.  In 
contrast, a few middle-income countries, such as Korea, Chile, and Singapore, have broken the 
property rights barrier and are considered to be low investment risks.  Firms have confidence that 
those countries will enforce the property rights of all investors.  In these countries, BITs vary 
more from the model treaties than in other developing countries.  Their stable investment 
environment enables them to negotiate over the terms or even to refuse to sign treaties without 
risking a lost of foreign investment.  For example, Singapore refused to enter into a BIT with the 
United States based on its model treaty because of the limits on performance requirements.  
Further, its treaties with France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands limit the protection offered to 
investors to specifically approved investment projects (Kishoiyian 1994). 
 
The middle cases are the most interesting to us.  These cases lie at mid-point of property rights 
evolution and could either stagnate or move forward. On the one hand, without BITs competition 
for foreign investors could encourage property rights reform—perhaps aided by small domestic 
investors who realize the potential benefits of establishing a rule of law. On the other hand, 
domestic elites and corrupt bureaucrats might attempt to maintain the status quo.  A 
governmental decision to reform property rights is unlikely if the rents are derived from the non-
enforcement of property rights are high, if incumbents do not expect to gain many benefits from 
reform (perhaps because they risk losing political power) and, most importantly, if the power of 
the opposing interest groups is high.   
 
Without BITs, improvements in property rights enforcement come from government decisions to 
foster economic growth through increased foreign and domestic investment.  But, this will only 
occur when the benefits of increased investment, combined with any political capital gained from 
those changes, outweighs the costs of enforcement and the political losses from those who lose 
out from the new system.  The trade literature has demonstrated that foreign investors have a 
great deal of power in host country political decisions.  Thus, in the absence of BITs, these 
investors might be advocates of broader reforms that could benefit all investors. In contrast, a 
world with BITs reduces the interest of MNCs in property rights reform and enforcement in 
developing countries.  Domestic reform may be less likely and the country may even regress 
toward policies that harm domestic investors. In some countries, attempts at reform fail, or no   11 
attempts at reform are made at all. In such cases, the BIT, although benefiting foreign investors, 
can have a negative effect on the trustworthiness of the business environment for domestic 
investors. 
 
It is instructive to mention a few cases that indicate the possible disjunction between property 
rights and BITs.  In many countries, western donor agencies, especially USAID, in conjunction 
with the local chamber of commerce, work to establish local arbitration tribunals to deal with 
investment disputes.  USAID also promotes BITs to overcome the exact problems that the local 
arbitration tribunals were meant to deal with.  Thus, if BITs prove effective, the pressure for 
property rights reform that was evident through these local tribunals may well be scaled back.   
 
Botswana and Namibia have the highest property rights rankings of all countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa in both the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Heritage Foundation, two 
generally accepted ratings of property rights.  Yet, as of 2000, Botswana was a signatory to two 
BITs, only one of which is with a developed country (Switzerland) and Namibia has signed only 
five.  Zimbabwe and South Africa, neighboring countries with significantly lower rankings on 
the property rights scale, have signed 24 and 18 BITs, respectively.   
 
In Latin America, cases do not stand out as clearly.  However, Peru and Venezuela, two 
countries that both embarked on specific programs of property rights reform and failed are well 
above the mean for BITs in the remainder of Latin America.  Specifically, Peru and Venezuela 
have signed 26 and 22 BITs respectively, with the mean for Latin America below 14.  Peru’s 
attempt at reform is notable.  A program to reform the property rights system and ensure its 
enforcement was supported by a grant from the World Bank.  Additionally, a well-known local 
non-governmental organization initiated a public information campaign to inform potential 
investors of the benefits of property rights.  Yet the program was terminated a year and a half 
into the project, before actual implementation ever began.
19  It is, of course, unlikely that BITs 
played the primary role in impeding property rights enforcement reform in Peru.  However, a 
lack of pressure from major investors for reform appears to have played a major role. 
 
D.  Conclusions 
 
Many observers of the global business environment view the growing internationalization of 
commercial law, through BITs and international arbitration, as a desirable trend.  They urge its 
expansion to cover a broader range of contract disputes. However, although international 
commercial law norms and BITs reduce risk and solve collective action problems, their impact 
on social welfare is ambiguous. They may impose “discipline” on governments that would 
otherwise favor narrow interests or demand corrupt payoffs (Waelde 1999). Alternatively, these 
standards may reduce a nation’s flexibility in negotiations and lead it to favor outside investors 
or narrow local interests over the general population.  Because BITs are based on models drafted 
by capital exporting states and express little concern with improving the overall legal structures 
of developing countries, they may reduce the available benefits to the host country from FDI 
(Guzmán 1997).   
 
IV.  Quantitative Analysis 
                                                 
19 LCHR (2000) and The Economist.  “The dark side of the boom,” August 5, 1995   12 
 
An empirical analysis of the effects of BITs requires a two-pronged approach.  First, we look at 
how BITs interact with other determinants of foreign investment to affect FDI inflows.  The 
main benefit of BITs is purported to be increased FDI to developing countries, this analysis takes 
the first step towards understanding if this is true.  Second, we analyze the effects of BITs and 
the domestic business environment through their effects on domestic private investment and on 
property rights.   
 
The data for our study are based on various indicators of government performance, investment 
rates, social indicators, and investment treaties in up to 176 countries.  The datasets were 
compiled from a variety of sources and therefore contain a different number of observations for 
different variables.  The data sets use panel data from the first BIT signed in 1959 through 2000 
for low and middle-income countries
20 to take into account the dynamic nature of some of the 
data, and to control for some of the statistical problems inherent in cross sectional analyses of 
this type.   
 
 
A.  FDI 
 
There is a broad empirical literature on the determinants of FDI.
21  A review of the literature 
shows that there is no clear agreement on the factors that determine FDI inflows to developing 
countries. The studies use diverse variables and often come to opposing findings on the 
relationship between certain variables and investment.  Nevertheless, we can use past work to 
specify a reasonable model for the determinants of investment as a basis for understanding the 
impact of BITs.  We break our analysis into two parts, a general analysis to determine the impact 
of signing the treaties on overall FDI inflows and a bilateral analysis between the United States 
and low and middle income countries. 
 
1.  General Analysis 
 
As the dependent variable for our general analysis we use the broadest measure of FDI inflows 
available on a yearly basis from UNCTAD.
22 We measure FDI as inflows to a particular country 
as a percentage of world FDI inflows for that year.  In this case we are interested in how each 
country’s fraction of world FDI inflows increases (or decreases) based on the number of treaties 
signed.  The ratio of inflows to a particular country for each year to overall FDI flows to all 
countries is the best measurement of change in the fraction of world FDI.
23    FDI inflows are 
provided on a net basis, and include capital provided (either directly or through other related 
enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise or capital received from an FDI 
                                                 
20 Appendix D contains a list of countries used in each analysis.  Appendix F contains correlations between 
variables in each of the analyses. 
21 Chakrabarti(2001) offers a good overview of the literature on the determinants of FDI.  For more specific 
analyses, see for example: Schneider, F. and B. Frey (1985), Root and Alimed (1979), Sader (1993), Billington 
(1999), Markusen  (1990), Gastanaga et al (1998), Ozler and Rodrik(1992), and Henisz(2000). 
22 See appendix E for sources and definitions of variables and appendix F for summary statistics. 
23 We re-ran the models using FDI as a percentage of GDP, and the results did not change significantly.  This ratio, 
however, measures changes in the importance of FDI to the overall economy, rather than changes in inflows, the 
measure we are interested in, so we retained our ratio of FDI inflows to overall FDI flows.   13 
enterprise by a foreign direct investor. There are three components in FDI: equity capital, 
reinvested earnings, and intra-company loans.  If one of these three components is negative and 
is not offset by positive amounts in the remaining components, the resulting measure of FDI 
inflows can be negative, indicating disinvestment. 
24 
 
Market size is universally accepted as the leading determinant of FDI inflows.  We use two 
proxies that, taken together, indicate the value of investing to serve a country’s market. The first 
is the log of GDP per capita, and the second is population. Beyond market size, there is general 
disagreement on the determinants of FDI.  Theoretically, the rate of growth of a country’s 
economy would seem to be important for attracting FDI, as a fast growing economy in the 
present would indicate future development potential (Schneider and Frey 1985).   We are 
interested in understanding how growth, market size, and BITs affect subsequent foreign 
investment.  However, although growth and market size affect the level of investment in a 
country, it is also likely that the opposite direction of causation operates as well.  That is, higher 
investment leads to greater growth and a larger market.  We deal with this problem by lagging 
these variables in one case, and instrumenting for them with their lagged value in our second 
case. 
 
Black market premia are a symptom of overvaluation of national currencies and thus are likely to 
relate to lower levels of investment.   They are often used in empirical evaluations as a proxy for 
distortions in the financial system.  The black market premium is taken from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and is defined as the ratio of the black market exchange rate and 
official exchange rate minus one. 
 
According to UNCTAD (2001), the majority of FDI to the least developed countries is through 
natural resource investment.  The presence of natural resources in a country is expected to attract 
foreign investment regardless of other factors that would usually attract or discourage investors.  
Natural resource endowments are measured through a composite of natural fuels and ores 
exported from individual countries, available from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
Database.   
 
We include political risk as a potential determinant of FDI inflows, theorizing that countries with 
high levels of political risk will attract less investment then those with low levels of risk.  There 
are several readily available measures of political risk.  For the purpose of cross-sectional 
comparison across time, and to have the ability to separate out factors such as property rights risk 
in our subsequent analysis, we use a measure produced by the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG).  Their variable is based on institutional indicators complied by private international 
investment risk services.  The ICRG political risk index utilizes measures of the risk of 
expropriation, established mechanisms for dispute resolution, contract enforcement, government 
credibility, corruption in government, and quality of bureaucracy.  It is measured on a scale from 
one to 100 (the individual components are available in appendix C) with higher numbers 
equating to lower (better) levels of risk in a country. 
 
                                                 
24 For more information see the World Investment Directory Website: 
http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/WID.htm   14 
Other independent variables are also readily available for analysis, including measures of human 
development, level of democracy, and geography.  To account for country specific factors, we 
also include a continent dummy and, latitude, a variable equal to the distance of the country from 
the equator, scaled between 0 and 1.
25  Theories of institutions and economic growth claim that 
countries in more temperate zones have more productive agriculture and healthier climates, 
enabling more highly developed economies and institutions (Landes 1998, La Porta et al 2000).  
Social factors such as literacy or health are highly collinear with our measures of market size and 
growth and were therefore excluded from the model.   
  
Depending on the type of FDI, the level of openness (measured as exports plus imports to GDP) 
could have a positive or negative impact on a country’s ability to attract FDI.  FDI focused on 
exploiting the local market would be attracted to a country with a less open economy, and FDI 
focused on the tradeables sector would be positively related to openness.  The opposing nature of 
the theory as well as gaps in the data for our sub-sample of countries led us to exclude openness 
from our estimation.  Likewise, we exclude inflation from our analysis, as we expect the impact 
of inflation to be ambiguous. On the one hand, if lending is done in the local currency, 
unanticipated inflation benefits debtors. On the other hand, high inflation rates may indicate 
domestic policy failures that discourage both savings and investment.
26  Further variables that 
could act as determinants of FDI that we excluded because of opposing theory or data 
inefficiencies include the host country’s wage, government consumption, and tax rates.  The host 
country wage has been shown in various studies to be both an inducement and a deterrent to FDI 
based on the type of investment.  For example, Schneider and Frey (1985) and Pistoresi (2000) 
found that higher wages tended, on average, to discourage FDI, although Caves (1974) and 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) found a positive association between FDI inflows and the real wage.  
Tax rates do not let us separate out tax incentives to attract investment from high tax rates that 
deter FDI.
27   Likewise, overall measures of government consumption do not permit one to 
separate out that which types of spending attract investment and that which are deterrents. 
 
Data on BITs are available from a listing published by UNCTAD that documents the parties to 
every bilateral investment treaty, the date of signature, and the date of entry into force.  These 
data are available for every BIT of public record from the first treaty signed in 1959 between 
Germany and Pakistan through December 2000 (UNCTAD 2000).  Because of the long-term 
nature of BITs, we measure our BIT variable as the cumulative number of BITs signed by a 
particular country.  We separate out those BITs signed with developed countries from those 
signed with developing countries to determine if the treaty partner might have some effect on the 
investment or property rights level in the host country. 
 
                                                 
25 We also considered including legal origin in our analysis.  However, the meaning of this variable is in doubt. It 
may simply be capturing general historical regularities. For purposes of robustness we included it in one version of 
our random effects specification, but it’s coefficient estimates across specifications was zero and insignificant, and 
its inclusion did not affect the remaining variables. 
26 Inclusion of inflation in our specifications does not change the results on the remaining variables and resulted in 
insignificant coefficient estimates. 
27 We included measures of taxes on goods and taxes on income available from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics in both sets of regressions on FDI and private investment.  The coefficients were equal to zero and not 
statistically significant in any regression. This, in addition to the problems discussed in the text, led us to exclude 
them from the analyses.   15 
To avoid the impact of year-to-year variation caused by the pattern of individual deals, we use 
five year averages for the BIT data for the period 1975 to 2000.
28  To limit the problem of 
simultaneity, we measure the potentially endogenous variables at the beginning of each five year 
period and our dependent variables at the end of each period.  
 
We chose to model the data in two forms.  First, to account for differences across countries, we 
run a random effects generalized least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors as 
suggested by Beck and Katz (1995).  In this model we account for the possible endogeneity of 
our regressors by measuring FDI at the end of the period and market size, political risk, and 
growth at the beginning of the period.  All other variables are measured as the average over the 
five-year period. 
 
Our primary specification for foreign direct investment to low and middle income countries is as 
follows: 
 
it i it i it v B Y + + + = D X g a  
 
Where Y is a vector of FDI inflows as a percentage of world FDI, X represents a matrix of 
potential determinants of FDI that can change across time, including BITs; D likewise represents 
a matrix of possible determinants of FDI, but these are country-specific factors that do not 
change across time.  The subscript i represents country i and the subscript t represents time 
period t.   
 
Our second specification accounts for changes within countries across time. We model a 
generalized least squares, fixed effects model.  This model takes into account the endogeneity 
problem by instrumenting for growth and market size with their lagged values.  Our remaining 
variables, natural resources, black market premia, and political risk are measured as the average 
over the five year period. 
 
Thus our second model is: 
     
     
 
where all other variables remain the same, but D, the vector of independent variables that do not 
change across time is omitted, and Z is a matrix of individual dummies to measure unobservable 
country-specific effects. 
 
                                                 
28 Although some of our data goes back to 1959, the bulk of the data covers 1975 to 2000. 
it i i it i it v B Y + + + = Z X m a  16 
A Hausman specification test rejected the assumption that the error component from the random 
effects model was uncorrelated with the error in that model.  Thus, our random effects model 
will be less efficient then our fixed effects model.  However, because of the paucity of the data 
across time for a number of our countries, we felt that it was important to examine the 
implications of both models. 
 **indicates significant at .05 level, *indicates significant at .10 level; ^ indicates joint significance of f-test. 
Standard errors in parentheses    17 
Table 1 
FDI and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Random Effects Model (1980-2000) 
                         
        Base Case  2     3     4     5   
Run:  BITs signed with            0.0670 *
* 
    -0.00380 ^ 
High income            (0.0329)       (0.109)  
                         
Run:  BITs signed with            -0.0860       -0.0491 ^ 
low income            (0.0581)       (0.288)  
                         
Run:  BITs signed with      0.0160 *      -0.00720 ^     
Total          (0.0091)       (0.0672)      
                         
Natural log GDP per capita    0.139 **  0.132 *
* 
0.118 *
* 
0.129 *
* 
0.114 ** 
      (0.019)   (0.0126)   (0.0113)   (0.0045)   (0.0153)  
                         
Political Risk    0.0116 **  0.0109 *
* 
0.0111 *
* 
0.00980 *
* 
0.00892 ** 
      (0.0053)   (0.0049)   (0.00523)   (0.00111)   (0.00261)  
                         
Risk*Total BITs                0.000450 ^     
                  (0.00149)      
                         
Risk*lowincome BITs                    -0.000720 ^ 
                      (0.00608)  
                         
Risk*highincome BITs                    0.00124 ^ 
                      (0.00260)  
                         
Black Market Premium    0.00393   0.00098 *  0.00140   0.000824 *  0.00110 ** 
      (0.00607)   (0.00056)   (0.00878)   (0.00043)   (0.000430)  
                         
Natural log Population  0.209 **  0.218 
*
*  0.230 
*
*  0.221 
*
*  0.234 ** 
      (0.0140)   (0.0090)   (0.00944)   (0.00745)   (0.010)  
                         
Growth      (0.0008)   0.00046   0.0020   0.000381   0.00168  
      (0.0146)   (0.0144)   (0.0143)   (0.0144)   (0.0137)  
                         
Natural Resources    -0.00021   0.00015   0.000092   0.000217   0.000206  
      (0.0015)   (0.0014)   (0.00136)   (0.00134)   0.00142  
                         
Latitude      -0.246 **  -0.118 
*
*  0.322   -0.0926   0.370  
      (0.101)   (0.024)   (0.345)   (0.0843)   (0.398)  
                         
Latin America    0.279 **  0.395 *
* 
0.524 *
* 
0.404 *
* 
0.540 ** 
      (0.116)   (0.0493)   (0.0742)   (0.020)   (0.0790)  
                         
Africa      0.098   0.173 *
* 
0.228 *
* 
0.176 *
* 
0.240 ** 
      (0.131)   (0.086)   (0.050)   (0.078)   (0.0480)  
                         
Intercept      -4.82 **  -5.01 *
* 
-5.25 *
* 
-4.98 *
* 
-5.20 ** 
      (0.819)   (0.144)   (0.243)   (0.081)   (0.147)  
                                    
Country N    45   45   45   45   45  
R-squared    0.405   0.413   0.438   0.414   0.440  
 
 **indicates significant at .05 level, *indicates significant at .10 level; ^ indicates joint significance of f-test. 
Standard errors in parentheses    18 
 
Table 2 
FDI and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Fixed Effects Model (1980-2000) 
                       
      Base Case  2     3     4     5   
Run:  BITs signed with           0.0181       -0.128  
High income           (0.024)       (0.147)  
                       
Run:  BITs signed with           -0.0155       0.124  
low income           (0.0306)       (0.189)  
                       
Run:  BITs signed with      0.0083       -0.0555      
Total         (0.0167)       (0.0859)      
                        
Natural log GDP per capita    0.191 *
* 
0.195 *
* 
0.197 *
* 
0.193 *
* 
0.198 ** 
      (0.067)   (0.0651)   (0.0647)   (0.0674)   (0.0660)  
                        
Political Risk    0.0140 *
* 
0.0137 *  0.0137 *  0.0106   0.00918  
      (0.0072)   (0.0074)   (0.0074)   (0.0099)   (0.0110)  
                        
Risk*Total BITs               0.00122      
                 (0.00185)      
                        
Risk*lowincome BITs                   -0.00265  
                     (0.00353)  
                        
Risk*highincome BITs                   0.00279  
                     (0.00307)  
                        
Black Market Premium    0.00154   0.00182   0.00190   0.00131   0.00119  
      (0.00227)   (0.0021)   (0.00212)   (0.00231)   (0.00243)  
                        
Natural log Population  0.170 *
* 
0.167 *
* 
0.167 *
* 
0.171 *
* 
0.171 ** 
      (0.0646)   (0.0692)   (.0693)   (0.0677)   (0.0687)  
                        
Growth      -0.012   -0.0116   -0.0119   -0.0105   -0.010  
      (0.0137)   (0.0135)   (0.0136)   (0.0146)   (0.0152)  
                        
Natural Resources                  
                    
                        
Intercept      -4.05 
*
*  -4.49 
*
*  -4.52 
*
*  -4.39**   -4.36 ** 
      (1.43)   (1.47)   (1.47)   (1.58)   (1.63)  
                                  
Country N    46    46    46    46    46   
R-squared    0.340   0.341   0.343   0.347   0.352  
Root MSE    0.538    0.538    0.5405    0.5405    0.5410      19 
Both of our models clearly demonstrate the importance of GDP per capita, political risk, and 
population or market size for determining FDI.  Although the coefficients on political risk and 
GDP appear small, it is important to remember that average FDI inflows as a percentage of 
world inflows for the countries in our sample is 0.20 percent.  In both of our base specifications, 
we find a positive and significant relationship between GDP per capita and FDI inflows, 
controlling for the remaining determinants of FDI.  Specifically, in our fixed effects model, a 
one-percent increase in GDP per capita leads to a 0.19 percent increase in a country’s share of 
total world FDI, while in our random effects model that equates to a 0.13 percent increase.  
Similarly, political risk has a significant and positive effect on FDI in our base case, with a one 
unit increase in the political risk scale (equating to an improvement in political risk) equating to a 
.01 percent increase in the share of a country’s FDI inflows as a percentage of world inflows, in 
both models.  Likewise, an increase of 1 percent in the population of a country, on average, 
equates to an increase of 17% in a county’s share of world FDI from our fixed effects model, and 
this share is even greater in the random effects model. 
 
The remaining variables in our fixed effects model appear to have no effect on FDI.  When we 
add BITs into the model, the basic results remain the same, with BITs having a positive 
relationship with FDI inflows.
29   However, the only point where this relationship is statistically 
significant is the joint significance of the treties in their interaction with political risk.  Thus, for 
our analysis, column four in tables 1 and 2 is the most interesting.  In our random effects model, 
only the continent indicators of our time invariant variables retain significance through all of the 
models.  The joint effect of BITs and BITs interacted with political risk proved to be significant 
at the .05 significance level.  This enables us to consider whether BITs may have different effects 
on countries depending on their level of political risk.
30  By interacting the cumulative total 
number of BITs signed with political risk, table 3 shows that as political risk goes down 
(increases in the actual indicator) the conditional effect of an additional BIT on FDI decreases.  
In other words, as countries become less risky, BITs do less to attract FDI.  This is what we 
would expect if BITs were basically identical across countries. They should have more of a 
marginal effect on countries that are relatively risky.  
 
Thus, the number of BITs signed appears to have little impact on a country’s ability to attract 
FDI. However, there does appear to be an interaction between the level of political risk and 
property rights protection. Countries that are relatively risky seem to be able to attract somewhat 
more FDI by signing BITS. For those that are relatively safe for investors the marginal effect of 
BITs is small. Of course, because the data do not include either very risky or very safe countries, 
we are much more confident of our findings for the middle range of countries in our data set. 
                                                 
29 We estimated the model in three ways, just looking at BITs signed with high income countries, separating out 
high and low income BITs, and finally the cumulative total of BITs.  The results were robust to all three 
specifications, so we retain the cumulative total.  Additionally, we separated out US BITs from the cumulative total 
of BITs and the estimates revealed that having signed a US BIT actually decreases a country’s share of world FDI 
by two percent. 
30 This analysis failed to present significant results in both columns four and five of the fixed effects model and 
column five of the random effects model.  The following analysis refers to column four of table .     20 
 
Table 3 
Effects of BITs on FDI Conditional on Political Risk 
Range of PR    
Conditional 
effects of 
BITs on 
FDI    
Standard 
error of 
conditional 
effect    
t statistics of 
conditional 
effect    
Countries 
with avg. 
in range 
                
0(high risk)    0.036    0.019    1.89    
5    0.035    0.017    2.03    
10    0.034    0.015    2.21    
15    0.033    0.014    2.44    
20    0.032    0.012    2.73    
25    0.031    0.01    3.13    
30    0.03    0.008    3.67    
35    0.029    0.007    4.43    1 
40    0.028    0.005    5.47    3 
45    0.027    0.004    6.56    7 
50    0.026    0.004    6.66    4 
55    0.025    0.005    5.43    9 
60    0.024    0.006    4.06    9 
65    0.023    0.007    3.06    5 
70    0.022    0.009    2.37    4 
75    0.021    0.011    1.88    
80    0.019    0.013    1.53    
85    0.018    0.015    1.26    
90    0.017    0.016    1.05    
95    0.016    0.018    0.89    
100(low risk)     0.015     0.02     0.75      
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2.  Bilateral Analysis 
 
The most comprehensive source for FDI data is the “U.S. International Transactions Accounts 
Data,” produced yearly by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
31  The data 
comprise two broad areas covering all US FDI operations from 1950 through the present.  The 
BEA reports balance of payments and direct investment data on transactions between US parents 
and their foreign affiliates abroad, and financial and operating data covering the foreign 
operations of US-based multinational corporations. The BEA’s data generally conform to 
international reporting standards and are available with substantial country and industry detail.  
Thus, for understanding the bilateral relationship between FDI inflows and BITs, the BEA data 
would seem ideal.  Unfortunately, it is available only for MNCs based in the United States.  
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database 
on FDI, US-based MNCs accounted for only twelve percent of outward world FDI flows in 2000 
and 21 per cent of FDI outward stock.  Further, more than half of U.S. FDI is directed towards 
the European Union.  Nevertheless, the breadth and quality of the BEA data give a strong 
indication of the relationship between US BITs and US FDI flows (Mataloni 1995, Quijano 
1990, Lipsey 2001, and UNCTAD 2001). 
 
We measure FDI flows as capital inflows (outflows(-)) from the United States in millions of US 
dollars.  In this case, we are interested in changes in overall US capital stock into or out of a 
country as a result of signing a BIT with the US.  In other words, we care only about how signing 
a BIT with the US affects US FDI flows to that specific country.  FDI flows are the best indicator 
of yearly changes in US capital stock in our countries of interest.  Our BIT variable is a dummy 
equal to 1 in the year that a BIT was signed between the host country and the US and each year 
thereafter and a 0 for countries without US BITs. 
 
In addition to the variables used in the general analysis, we include a measure of distance 
between the US and the host country government in our pooled data analysis.  Distance serves as 
a proxy for the transport and trade costs that affect the firm’s decision to invest, and thus we 
assume that the greater the distance between a host country and the US, the lower the probability 
of US investment.  Further, to account for the bilateral nature of the flows, we include a measure 
of exchange rate stability of the host country, as well a variable to measure the difference in 
average years of schooling between the US and the host country to proxy for skill differences 
between the host and investing country.  Theoretical analysis posits that the greater the 
difference in skill level between countries, the lower the level of investment (Carr et al 2002).  
Specifically, we use the difference in total mean years of education between the United States 
and the host country as our measure of skill difference.  Theoretically, exchange rate levels and 
stability have an important influence on FDI flows, but their impact is ambiguous.  Exchange 
rate stability could increase investment in low productivity investment or investment for 
production in the local market, while decreasing investment in industries with high entry costs or 
investment tended for re-export (Bénassy-Quéré et al 1999). 
 
The endogeneity problem in our general model does not seem to be a concern in the case of US 
FDI flows.  Blonigen and Davies(2001), in their work on bilateral tax treaties with the US, point 
                                                 
31 The BEA’s U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data  is available on line for interactive analysis at: 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/di1fdibal.htm     22 
out that the U.S. does not limit BITs only to countries that have high FDI activity.  Appendix G 
demonstrates that there is no correlation between the levels of inflows of US FDI and the date 
that the treaty was signed.  In fact, in many cases, the US has signed treaties with host countries 
with very low FDI inflows.  Thus, we do not need to control for endogeneity in our estimates. 
 
We again model the data using pooled and fixed effects analysis.  Our model specifications are 
identical to those used above, except that we include a time trend in this case.  Data limitations 
necessitated year-to-year changes rather than observing means over five year periods as in the 
general analysis.  Our first two models lag only GDP per capita and growth, while our second 
two models lag all economic variables to account for greater changes over time. 
 
Our results from this more detailed analysis are interesting and counter-intuitive in many cases.  
Two of our most interesting results are the negative coefficients on both BITs and political risk, 
indicating that countries that have signed a BIT or have a BIT with the US in place are likely to 
have significantly lower FDI flows.  Likewise, the negative sign on political risk indicates that as 
the political risk indicator increases (equating to a less risky environment), FDI flows from the 
US also decrease.  Again, this runs counter to our intuition and accepted evidence on political 
risk, and so we must look to the interaction between political risk and the BIT, which while 
insignificant by itself, is significant at the 95% confidence level for all the regressions for joint 
significance of BITs and political risk. 
 
When we look at the conditional effect of the interaction, we observe an effect opposite to what 
we saw in our general analysis.  For US BITs, we see that as political risk goes down (increases 
in the actual indicator), the conditional effect of signing a BIT with the US actually increases 
conditional FDI inflows.  In other words, as countries become less risky, a BIT with the US 
actually aids in attracting greater FDI inflows from the US.  Unfortunately, we can only be 
certain of this outcome at very high levels of political risk. 
 
The negative sign on openness is not completely surprising.  The results tell us that the more 
open a country’s economy, the lower the inflows of US investment.  This could be a result of 
investment for the host country market, where more closed economies advantage the investor.   
GDP, time, education, and population all fit with our intuitive reasoning.  GDP and population, 
our proxies for market size, both agree with theoretical reasoning that the greater the market size, 
the larger the size of FDI inflows.  US outflows of FDI continue to increase yearly, and so it is 
not surprising that FDI flows increase along with time.  The coefficient on distance indicates that 
the further a country is from the United States, the lower the level of investment flows to that 
country, though this variable remains statistically insignificant from zero in the equations.  
Finally, the greater the difference in education levels between the US and the host country, the 
lower the level of FDI flows.  
 
Overall, these results indicate that signing a BIT with the US does not correspond to increased 
FDI inflows.  Additionally, it does not appear that the US BIT alleviates political risk factors for 
investors based in the US. 
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Table 4 
FDI and Bilateral Investment Treaties:  
Bilateral Relationship with the United States (1980-2000) 
      GDP lag     All lag    
      Random     Fixed Effects     Random     Fixed Effects  
BIT signed 
with US    -408.51    -477.97  **    -370.01    -463.71  *** 
    (301.96)    (208.07)      (339.33)    (195.50)   
                     
Ln GDP per 
capita    223.02  ***  49.41      266.73  ***  120.02   
    (82.28)    (187.92)      (81.44)    (191.63)   
                     
Political Risk    -9.47  ***  -10.65  ***    -7.19  **  -9.45  *** 
    (3.08)    (3.29)      (3.26)    (2.91)   
                     
Risk*Total 
BITs    4.39    6.03  *    4.15    6.58  ** 
    (4.84)    (3.31)      (5.74)    (3.41)   
                     
Growth    298.77    352.14  **    240.91    284.56   
    (225.23)    (176.85)      (237.42)    (178.09)   
                     
Population    0.00063  *  0.0025  *    .00066  **  0.0029   
    (0.00032)    (0.0016)      (.00030)    (0.0019)   
                     
Natural 
Resources    -1.81    -3.20      -1.69    -3.37  * 
    (1.64)    (2.09)      (1.66)    (1.94)   
                     
Openness    -2.89  **  -2.20  *    -3.41  **  -2.64  ** 
    (1.34)    (1.35)      (1.34)    (1.32)   
                     
Exchange Rate 
Stability    0.082    0.09      0.25    0.44   
    (0.057)    (0.10)      (0.19)    (0.48)   
                     
Skill Difference    -58.53    -236.64  ***    -31.92    -247.05  *** 
    (40.50)    (72.01)      (35.66)    (77.92)   
                     
Time Counter    51.97  ***  40.54  ***    50.86  ***  36.60  *** 
    (6.46)    (9.35)      (7.02)    (8.82)   
                     
Distance    -0.020          -0.02       
    (0.026)          (0.02)       
                     
Constant    -103646.6  ***  -78501.74  ***    -102062.1  ***  -71163.91  *** 
      (12891.86)     (18152.41)        (14037.81)     (17131.32)   
                     
Countries    54    54      0    54   
Observations    667    667      0    622   
R-Squared    0.17    0.59      0.18    0.61       24 
B.  Private Domestic Investment 
We estimate the determinants of private domestic investment in a similar manner to our model of 
FDI except that the dependent variable is measured in per capita terms.  We build on the 
literature on the determinants of private investment in developing countries
32.  Market size, 
proxied by GDP per capita, and growth rates of the country are again theorized to be the primary 
determinants of investment.  The financial depth or overall size of the financial sector of a 
country is also likely to be an important determinant.  We proxy financial depth with a measure 
of liquid liabilities.  The hypothesis is that the greater the size of the financial sector in a country, 
the more investment we should see.  As in the FDI regression, we exclude taxes and inflation.
33 
As with FDI, political risk is likely to be an important determinant of private investment.  
Finally, we include continent and latitude as country-specific effects.   
 
Private domestic investment is defined as the difference between total gross domestic investment 
(from national accounts) and consolidated public investment.  The variable is the ratio of 
domestic private investment to GDP. The ratios are computed using local currency units at 
current prices, readily available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
   
Aside from differences in variables, we model private investment identically to our FDI 
specification. 
                                                 
32 There are a number of good overviews of the determinants of private investment in developing countries.  See for 
example, Schmidt-Hebbel et al (1996), Wai, and Wong (1982), and Ndikumana (2001). 
33 Robustness checks again resulted in coefficients of zero with no statistical significance and no change to the 
remaining estimates. **indicates significant at .05 level, *indicates significant at .10 level; ^ indicates joint significance of f-test.  25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 5 
Private Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties:  
Random Effects Model (1980-2000) 
                                    
      Base Case  2    3    4      
BITs signed with            0.34 **        
High income              (0.13)         
                         
BITs signed with            -0.29 **        
Low income              (0.09)         
                         
Total BITs      -0.05       0.53 **     
          (0.04)       (0.26)      
                         
Natural log GDP per capita    2.08 **  1.96 **  2.13 **  2.08 **    
      (0.68)   (0.68)   (0.68)   (0.69)     
                         
Political Risk    0.03   0.05   0.03   0.08 **    
      (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)     
                         
Risk*Total BITs                -0.01      
                  (0.01)      
                         
Liquid Liabilities    0.04   0.04   0.04   0.05     
      (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)     
                         
Growth      -0.05   -0.05   -0.05   -0.06     
      (0.14)   (0.14)   (0.13)   (0.13)     
                         
Natural Resources    -0.05 **  -0.05 **  -0.05 **  -0.05 **    
      (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)     
                         
Time Counter    0.50    0.93 **  0.78 **  0.79 **    
      (0.32)    (0.36)    (0.35)    (0.37)     
Latitude      -13.63 **  -12.76 **  -12.46 **  -13.91 **    
      (4.53)   (4.58)   (4.58)   (4.64)     
                         
Latin America    -3.90 **  -4.14 **  -3.70 **  -3.74     
      (1.39)   (1.41)   (1.41)   (1.43)     
                         
Africa      -7.68 **  -8.21 **  -7.76 **  -7.77     
      (1.66)   (1.71)   (1.71)   (1.73)     
                         
Intercept      1.12   1.07   -0.22   -1.54     
      (4.33)   (4.33)   (4.34)   (4.51)     
                    
Country N    40   40   40   40     
R-squared    0.410   0.416   0.446   0.426     
 **indicates significant at .05 level, *indicates significant at .10 level; ^ indicates joint significance of f-test.  26 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
TABLE 6 
Private Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties:  
Instrumental Variables Fixed Effects regression (1980-2000) 
                     
        Base Case     2     3     4      
BITs signed with            0.43 **        
high income              (0.19)         
                        
BITs signed with            -0.31 **        
low income              (0.13)         
                        
Total BITs      0.003       0.45 *    
          (0.044)       (0.25)     
                        
Natural log GDP per capita    1.6 **  1.6 **  1.84 **  1.67 **    
      (0.63)   (0.63)   (0.6)   (0.62)     
                        
Political Risk    0.02   0.02   0.01   0.05     
      (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05)     
                        
Risk*Total BITs                -0.01 *    
                  (0.01)     
                        
Liquid Liabilities    0.07 **  0.07 **  0.06 **  0.07 **    
      (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)     
                        
Growth      -0.06   -0.07   -0.05   -0.07     
      (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.12)     
                        
Time Counter    0.52    0.64    0.64    0.58     
      (0.38)    (0.46)    (0.43)    (0.46)     
                        
Intercept      -2.33   -2.32   -4.4   -4.69     
      (4.97)   (5.23)   (5.01)   (5.4)     
                                  
Country N    40   40   40   40     
R-squared    0.21   0.21   0.27   0.23     
Root MSE     4.39    4.41    4.28    4.39      
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In both of our specifications, market size appears to be the most significant determinant of 
private investment.  Specifically, an increase of one percent in GDP per capita increases private 
investment over GDP by approximately two percent in both of our models.  Our fixed effects 
model posits that for every one percent increase of liquid liabilities in the economy, private 
investment increases by .07 percent.  This is not true in our random effects model, where our 
coefficient estimate is not significantly different from zero.  The importance of natural resources 
has a negative impact on domestic investment in the random effects model.  We omitted natural 
resources from our fixed effects regression, as they had little impact on the remainder of the 
model and would be accounted for in the country fixed effects. In our random effects model, we 
are able to view some of the country specific effects.   For example, the closer a country is to the 
equator, the lower the level of private investment in the economy. Latin America and Africa 
have lower levels of investment then do the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
 
In both cases, BITs have a significant effect on investment. Although the individual coefficients 
on the interaction between separated BITs and political risk were insignificant, an F-test of the 
joint significance of all four coefficients was positive at the 0.05 level.  Specifically, for each 
additional BIT signed with a high-income country, private domestic investment increases on 
average by .34 percent.  At the same time, for each additional BIT signed with a low-income 
country, private investment decreases by about .29 percent.  These results were nearly identical 
in both of our models. 
 
In the fixed effects model, adding BITs together produced a significant effect on private 
investment when interacted with political risk, and this enables us to carry out the same exercise 
as with FDI.  We see that as political risk goes down (increases in the actual indicator), the 
conditional effect of an additional BIT on domestic investment falls actually becoming negative 
in the range of 70-100 (table 7).  In other words, as countries become less risky, the number of 
BITs in force appears to discourage domestic investment. We cannot tell from this exercise why 
this occurs, but one explanation is that the FDI that is encouraged by BITs is crowding out 
domestic investment in spite of the rather good political\legal environment. In contrast, at high 
levels of risk, BITs may encourage FDI that takes the form of joint ventures with local firms. 
Thus, BITs seem to have a positive relationship to private investment in developing countries 
except when political risk is low. Although we would like to know the type of investment they 
encourage, that is not possible from the available data. 
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Table 7 
Effects of BITs on Private Investment Conditional on Political Risk 
Range of PR    
Conditional 
effects of 
BITs on 
FDI    
Standard 
error of 
conditional 
effect    
t statistics of 
conditional 
effect    
Countries 
with avg. 
in range 
                
0 (high risk)    0.53    0.25    2.16    
5    0.49    0.23    2.16    
10    0.45    0.21    2.15    
15    0.41    0.19    2.15    
20    0.37    0.17    2.14    
25    0.32    0.15    2.13    
30    0.28    0.13    2.12    
35    0.24    0.11    2.11    1 
40    0.20    0.10    2.09    3 
45    0.16    0.08    2.06    7 
50    0.12    0.06    1.99    4 
55    0.08    0.04    1.86    9 
60    0.04    0.03    1.44    9 
65    0.00    0.02    -0.25    5 
70    -0.05    0.02    -1.91    4 
75    -0.09    0.04    -2.18    
80    -0.13    0.06    -2.23    
85    -0.17    0.08    -2.23    
90    -0.21    0.09    -2.23    
95    -0.25    0.11    -2.23    
100 (low risk)    -0.29     0.13     -2.23      
 
 
The results obtained when separating BITs out by home country economy need further 
explanation.  There could be a number of reasons, both positive and negative for the observed 
positive relationship between private investment and BITs with high income countries.  We can 
think of two possible alternatives.  If the treaties stimulated FDI, this positive result could be the 
consequence of positive spillovers from foreign investment.  However, our results in the prior 
section on FDI suggest that this is not happening as a share of total FDI. Alternatively, this result 
could indicate increased investment from the existing domestic business class, more confident in 
the maintenance of the property rights status quo.  The negative result on BITs signed with 
developing economies could be the result of increased investment and competition from 
neighboring countries substituting for existing domestic investment.  These results suggest that it 
is important to see if any relationship exists between BITs and property rights.  Our results are 
preliminary, but give us an approximation of the relationship.     29 
C.  Property Rights 
 
Our final estimation is a first attempt to look at the effect of BITs on property rights.  To estimate 
the effect of BITs on property rights, we again begin with the base specification of determinants 
of property rights other than BITs.  This model is difficult to specify given the subjective nature 
of the available measures of property rights.  A number of qualitative statistics exist, as well as 
proxy measures such as credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP.  Proxy measures 
generally correlate highly with investment.  We operationalize property rights as a combination 
of a series of factors from the ICRGs political risk rating (used in the earlier analyses).  
Specifically, we combine the four indicators that ought to have the strongest effect on an 
investor’s decision to invest in his property: the investment profile of a country (measured as a 
combination of the viability of contracts, probability of expropriation, and the ability to repatriate 
profits), its level of law and order, and its level of corruption. 
 
Although a great deal of evidence exists on the effects of property rights on economic growth 
and stability, the determinants of strong property rights are hard to estimate.  Measures of 
economic growth and government stability will likely serve as the primary determinants of 
property rights.  However, although these factors may influence the strength of property rights in 
a country, stronger property rights will also have a positive influence on economic factors.    We 
also include a variable for socio-economic indicators of the population drawn from the ICRG 
dataset. We account for overall social conditions through ICRG’s composite index that measures 
conditions that may constrain government action, unemployment, consumer confidence and 
poverty.  Finally, we include natural resources as likely determinants of property rights.  
Although higher levels of natural resources could have a positive effect on FDI inflows, their 
effect on property rights should be zero or negative.  As our above results indicate, poor 
protection of property rights discourages FDI. However, countries with higher levels of natural 
resources should have less need to protect property rights because FDI will flow towards natural 
resources regardless of the property rights regime. However, our own results results, reported 
above did not find natural resource endowments to be a significant determinant of FDI. 
 
We employ an independent variable, fixed-effects time series model with panel corrected 
standard errors.  In this case we have a larger sample size with greater variation across time than 
in our prior estimations. (We also ran the random effects model, but came up with nearly 
identical results.)  We instrument for economic growth factors with lagged values of the 
regressors to limit inconsistency arising from simultaneity bias.  The model is identical to our 
earlier fixed effects regressions with instrumental variables except that some of the included 
variables are different.   
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Table 8 
Property Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties (1980-2000)    
                 
         Base Case  2     3   
Run:  BITs signed with            0.004  
high income            (0.05)  
                 
Run:  BITs signed with            0.03  
low income            (0.02)  
                 
Run:  BITs signed with        0.02      
Total          (0.01)      
                 
Natural log GDP per capita   0.68 **  0.65 **  0.65 ** 
      (0.19)   (0.19)   (0.19)  
                 
Growth      -0.002   -0.005   -0.005  
      (0.024)   (0.025)   (0.025)  
                 
Natural Resources    -0.01   -0.01   -0.01  
      (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
                 
Socio economic indicator  1.09 **  1.06 **  1.06 ** 
      (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.11)  
                 
Time Counter    0.88 **  0.77 **  0.78 ** 
      (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.13)  
                 
Intercept      -4.85 **  -3.96 **  -3.99 ** 
      (1.51)   (1.59)   (1.59)  
                          
Country N    68   68   68  
R-squared    0.550   0.557   0.558  
Root MSE     1.875    1.864    1.866   
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In our base case, we find that GDP per capita, our indicator of the socioeconomic structure, and 
time are the primary determinants of property rights.  Growth and natural resources do not have 
statistically significant results in any of our regressions.  The negative sign on natural resources 
is interesting, but may simply be a result of resource rich countries tending to have political 
systems with weaker institutions.  Specifically, we find that an increase of one percent in GDP 
per capita leads to an increase of .68 on the property rights scale.  Similarly, an increase of 1 in 
the socio-economic indicator leads to an increase of one in the property rights scale, and for 
every additional 5 year period, property rights increase by .88.  Adding BITs to our model had no 
apparent effect on the results.  Perhaps the most interesting result is the importance of time for 
improving property rights.  Although some of the time effect may reflect the effects of BITs, it is 
interesting to note that in general, countries tend to be moving towards greater protection of 
property rights, all else equal. Thus, from this preliminary specification we cannot say that BITs 
have any significant effect on domestic property rights. There do not seem to be spillovers, either 
negative or positive, on domestic institutions. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
With the advent of BITs, foreign investors are assured of a strong, binding property rights system 
outlined in international or industrialized country law.  Local players in the business sector, 
however, are left with the often-unstable property rights system of their home country.  When 
foreign investors can able bypass local law and lower their risk through BITs, developing 
country governments may have lost a major incentive to strengthen their domestic property 
rights regimes.  Thus BITs can have both costs and benefits for emerging economies. Our 
analysis takes a first step towards understanding the conflicting impacts of BITs on the domestic 
business environment. 
 
Overall, we conclude that the relationship between BITs and FDI is weak.  In general, BITs 
appear to have little impact on FDI.  Likewise, we find little relationship between the existence 
of a BIT with the United States and the level of US FDI.  Where there is a relationship, it is 
weakly negative.  However, BITs are not always ineffectual. Indeed, when countries are 
relatively risky, we find that BITs do attract greater amounts of FDI.  This indicates that one of 
the major reasons for signing BITs, decreasing the risk of property rights infringement for 
foreign investors, may indeed be fulfilled.  BITs, therefore, appear to be important instruments 
for riskier countries that wish to attract FDI, but, in general, they may not fulfill their major 
objective. 
 
Analyzing the relationship between BITs and the domestic investment environment is important 
because we seek to understand whether the treaties might be disadvantageous for domestic 
investors.  We found that such disadvantages might arise in countries where political risk is low.  
However, these are countries where BITs do not play a very significant role.  Overall, however, 
there seems to be a positive relationship between BITs and private domestic investment. Thus, 
although the treaties may advantage foreign investors over domestic investors, they do not 
appear to dampen domestic investment.  Furthermore, although our analysis is preliminary, no 
relationship seems to exist, either positive or negative, between BITs and domestic property 
rights.   
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The reasons behind stalled reform and weak law enforcement in developing countries are 
numerous, and BITs are certainly not the primary cause.  At the same time, it appears that a tool 
designed to reduce risk and increase foreign investment to low and middle-income countries has 
no impact on the overall investment environment. Signing BITs with high-income countries does 
seem to have a positive impact on private domestic investment, but the causation does not flow 
through the domestic legal environment. Instead, the effect may reflect joint ventures or other 
direct spillovers from FDI for local entrepreneurs. BITs may even limit domestic investment in 
countries with relatively good institutions perhaps by crowding out local investors. Obviously, 
much work needs to be done to assess the repercussions of BITs.  Further work needs to 
disaggregate investment decisions to see if different types of FDI are more or less affected by 
BITs and, perhaps more importantly, to determine if differences in the content of BITs affect the 
overall business environment. 
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Figure 1a 
Figure 1b     34 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Non FDI Flows include portfolio flows and commercial bank loans 
*Percentage measured relative to GDP of all developing countries as a group (developing countries listed in footnote 7). 
 
Figure 2 
Private net resource flows to Developing Countries 
(as a percentage of GDP*)
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Number of New BITs Concluded by 
Developing Countries, by decade
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Figure 4 
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Appendix A.  World Bank Income Classifications: 
The World Bank income classifications are divided according to 2000 GNI per capita, calculated using the 
World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $755 or less; lower middle income, $756- 
$2,995; upper middle income, $2,996- $9,265; and high income, $9,266 or more (see 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/class.htm for more information). 
 
Low-income economies (63) 
Afghanistan   Ghana   Nicaragua  
Angola   Guinea   Niger  
Armenia   Guinea-Bissau   Nigeria  
Azerbaijan   Haiti   Pakistan  
Bangladesh   India   Rwanda  
Benin   Indonesia   Sao Tome and Principe  
Bhutan   Kenya   Senegal  
Burkina Faso   Korea, Dem Rep.   Sierra Leone  
Burundi   Kyrgyz Republic   Solomon Islands  
Cambodia   Lao PDR   Somalia  
Cameroon   Lesotho   Sudan  
Central African Republic   Liberia   Tajikistan  
Chad   Madagascar   Tanzania  
Comoros   Malawi   Togo  
Congo, Dem. Rep   Mali   Uganda  
Congo, Rep.   Mauritania   Ukraine  
Cote d'Ivoire   Moldova   Uzbekistan  
Eritrea   Mongolia   Vietnam  
Ethiopia   Mozambique   Yemen, Rep.  
Gambia, The   Myanmar   Zambia  
Georgia   Nepal   Zimbabwe  
 
Lower-middle-income economies (54) 
Albania   Guatemala   Paraguay  
Algeria   Guyana   Peru  
Belarus   Honduras   Philippines  
Belize   Iran, Islamic Rep.   Romania  
Bolivia   Iraq   Russian Federation  
Bosnia and Herzegovina   Jamaica   Samoa  
Bulgaria   Jordan   Sri Lanka  
Cape Verde   Kazakhstan   St. Vincent and the Grenadines  
China   Kiribati   Suriname  
Colombia   Latvia   Swaziland  
Cuba   Lithuania   Syrian Arab Republic  
Djibouti   Macedonia, FYR   Thailand  
Dominican Republic   Maldives   Tonga      38 
Ecuador   Marshall Islands   Tunisia  
Egypt, Arab Rep.   Micronesia, Fed. Sts.   Turkmenistan  
El Salvador   Morocco   Vanuatu  
Equatorial Guinea   Namibia   West Bank and Gaza  
Fiji   Papua New Guinea   Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.   
Upper-middle-income economies (38) 
American Samoa   Grenada   Poland  
Antigua and Barbuda   Hungary   Puerto Rico  
Argentina   Isle of Man   Saudi Arabia  
Bahrain   Korea, Rep.   Seychelles  
Botswana   Lebanon   Slovak Republic  
Brazil   Libya   South Africa  
Chile   Malaysia   St. Kitts and Nevis  
Costa Rica   Mauritius   St. Lucia  
Croatia   Mayotte   Trinidad and Tobago  
Czech Republic   Mexico   Turkey  
Dominica   Oman   Uruguay  
Estonia   Palau   Venezuela, RB  
Gabon   Panama      
High-income economies (52) 
Andorra   Germany   New Caledonia  
Aruba   Greece   New Zealand  
Australia   Greenland   Northern Mariana Islands  
Austria   Guam   Norway  
Bahamas, The   Hong Kong, China   Portugal  
Barbados   Iceland   Qatar  
Belgium   Ireland   San Marino  
Bermuda   Israel   Singapore  
Brunei   Italy   Slovenia  
Canada   Japan   Spain  
Cayman Islands   Kuwait   Sweden  
Channel Islands   Liechtenstein   Switzerland  
Cyprus   Luxembourg   United Arab Emirates  
Denmark   Macao, China   United Kingdom  
Faeroe Islands   Malta   United States  
Finland   Monaco   Virgin Islands (U.S.)  
France   Netherlands    
French Polynesia   Netherlands Antilles      
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Source:  Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce, U. S. Department of 
Commerce  
THE 1994 U.S. PROTOTYPE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY  
TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF _____________________________ 
CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENT 
 
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of __________ 
(hereinafter the "Parties");  
Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them, with respect to investment by 
nationals and companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party;  
Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the 
flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties;  
Agreeing that a stable framework for investment will maximize effective utilization of economic 
resources and improve living standards;  
Recognizing that the development of economic and business ties can promote respect for 
internationally recognized worker rights;  
Agreeing that these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental 
measures of general application; and  
Having resolved to conclude a treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of 
investment;  
Have agreed as follows:  
ARTICLE I  
For the purposes of this Treaty,  
(a) "company" means any entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or not 
for profit, and whether privately or governmentally owned or controlled, and includes a 
corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, branch, joint venture, association, or other 
organization;  
(b) "company of a Party" means a company constituted or organized under the laws of that Party;  
(c) "national" of a Party means a natural person who is a national of that Party under its 
applicable law;  
(d) "investment" of a national or company means every kind of investment owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by that national or company, and includes investment consisting or taking 
the form of:      40 
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(i) a company;  
(ii) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation, and bonds, debentures, and other forms 
of debt interests, in a company;  
(iii) contractual rights, such as under turnkey, construction or management contracts, production 
or revenue-sharing contracts, concessions, or other similar contracts;  
(iv) tangible property, including real property; and intangible property, including rights, such as 
leases, mortgages, liens and pledges;  
(v) intellectual property, including:  
copyrights and related rights, patents, rights in plant varieties, industrial designs, rights in 
semiconductor layout designs, trade secrets, including know-how and confidential business 
information, trade and service marks, and trade names; and  
(vi) rights conferred pursuant to law, such as licenses and permits;  
(e) "covered investment" means an investment of a national or company of a Party in the 
territory of the other Party;  
(f) "state enterprise" means a company owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by a 
Party;  
(g) "investment authorization" means an authorization granted by the foreign investment 
authority of a Party to a covered investment or a national or company of the other Party;  
(h) "investment agreement" means a written agreement between the national authorities of a 
Party and a covered investment or a national or company of the other Party that (i) grants rights 
with respect to natural resources or other assets controlled by the national authorities and (ii) the 
investment, national or company relies upon in establishing or acquiring a covered investment.  
(i) "ICSID Convention" means the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965;  
(j) "Centre" means the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes established by 
the ICSID Convention; and  
(k) "UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules" means the arbitration rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law.  
ARTICLE II  
1. With respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation 
and sale or other disposition of covered investments, each Party shall accord treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like situations, to investments in its territory of its own nationals 
or companies (hereinafter "national treatment") or to investments in its territory of nationals or 
companies of a third country (hereinafter "most favored nation treatment"), whichever is most      41 
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favorable (hereinafter "national and most favored nation treatment"). Each Party shall ensure that 
its state enterprises, in the provision of their goods or services, accord national and most favored 
nation treatment to covered investments.  
2. (a) A Party may adopt or maintain exceptions to the obligations of paragraph 1 in the sectors 
or with respect to the matters specified in the Annex to this Treaty. In adopting such an 
exception, a Party may not require the divestment, in whole or in part, of covered investments 
existing at the time the exception becomes effective.  
(b) The obligations of paragraph 1 do not apply to procedures provided in multilateral 
agreements concluded under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
relating to the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual property rights.  
3. (a) Each Party shall at all times accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security, and shall in no case accord treatment less favorable than that 
required by international law.  
(b) Neither Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable and discriminatory measures the 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of covered investments.  
4. Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect 
to covered investments.  
5. Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, administrative practices and procedures of 
general application, and adjudicatory decisions, that pertain to or affect covered investments are 
promptly published or otherwise made publicly available.  
ARTICLE III  
1. Neither Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly 
through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation") except for a 
public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation; and in accordance with due process of law and the general principles of 
treatment provided for in Article II(3).  
2. Compensation shall be paid without delay; be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken ("the date of 
expropriation"); and be fully realizable and freely transferable. The fair market value shall not 
reflect any change in value occurring because the expropriatory action had become known before 
the date of expropriation.  
3. If the fair market value is denominated in a freely usable currency, the compensation paid 
shall be no less than the fair market value on the date of expropriation, plus interest at a 
commercially reasonable rate for that currency, accrued from the date of expropriation until the 
date of payment.  
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4. If the fair market value is denominated in a currency that is not freely usable, the 
compensation paid -- converted into the currency of payment at the market rate of exchange 
prevailing on the date of payment -- shall be no less than:  
(a) the fair market value on the date of expropriation, converted into a freely usable currency at 
the market rate of exchange prevailing on that date, plus  
(b) interest, at a commercially reasonable rate for that freely usable currency, accrued from the 
date of expropriation until the date of payment.  
ARTICLE IV  
1. Each Party shall accord national and most favored nation treatment to covered investments as 
regards any measure relating to losses that investments suffer in its territory owing to war or 
other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance, or 
similar events.  
2. Each Party shall accord restitution, or pay compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 
through 4 of Article III, in the event that covered investments suffer losses in its territory, owing 
to war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, insurrection, civil 
disturbance, or similar events, that result from:  
(a) requisitioning of all or part of such investments by the Party's forces or authorities, or  
(b) destruction of all or part of such investments by the Party's forces or authorities that was not 
required by the necessity of the situation.  
ARTICLE V  
1. Each Party shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and 
without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include:  
(a) contributions to capital;  
(b) profits, dividends, capital gains, and proceeds from the sale of all or any part of the 
investment or from the partial or complete liquidation of the investment;  
(c) interest, royalty payments, management fees, and technical assistance and other fees;  
(d) payments made under a contract, including a loan agreement; and  
(e) compensation pursuant to Articles III and IV, and payments arising out of an investment 
dispute.  
2. Each Party shall permit transfers to be made in a freely usable currency at the market rate of 
exchange prevailing on the date of transfer.  
3. Each Party shall permit returns in kind to be made as authorized or specified in an investment 
authorization, investment agreement, or other written agreement between the Party and a covered 
investment or a national or company of the other Party.      43 
Appendix B (cont’d) 
 
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 through 3, a Party may prevent a transfer through the equitable, 
non-discriminatory and good faith application of its laws relating to:  
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of the rights of creditors;  
(b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities;  
(c) criminal or penal offenses; or  
(d) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in adjudicatory proceedings.  
ARTICLE VI  
Neither Party shall mandate or enforce, as a condition for the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct or operation of a covered investment, any requirement 
(including any commitment or undertaking in connection with the receipt of a governmental 
permission or authorization):  
(a) to achieve a particular level or percentage of local content, or to purchase, use or otherwise 
give a preference to products or services of domestic origin or from any domestic source;  
(b) to limit imports by the investment of products or services in relation to a particular volume or 
value of production, exports or foreign exchange earnings;  
(c) to export a particular type, level or percentage of products or services, either generally or to a 
specific market region;  
(d) to limit sales by the investment of products or services in the Party's territory in relation to a 
particular volume or value of production, exports or foreign exchange earnings;  
(e) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a national or 
company in the Party's territory, except pursuant to an order, commitment or undertaking that is 
enforced by a court, administrative tribunal or competition authority to remedy an alleged or 
adjudicated violation of competition laws; or  
(f) to carry out a particular type, level or percentage of research and development in the Party's 
territory.  
Such requirements do not include conditions for the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage.  
ARTICLE VII  
1. (a) Subject to its laws relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens, each Party shall permit to 
enter and to remain in its territory nationals of the other Party for the purpose of establishing, 
developing, administering or advising on the operation of an investment to which they, or a 
company of the other Party that employs them, have committed or are in the process of 
committing a substantial amount of capital or other resources.      44 
Appendix B (cont’d) 
 
(b) Neither Party shall, in granting entry under paragraph 1(a), require a labor certification test or 
other procedures of similar effect, or apply any numerical restriction.  
2. Each Party shall permit covered investments to engage top managerial personnel of their 
choice, regardless of nationality.  
ARTICLE VIII  
The Parties agree to consult promptly, on the request of either, to resolve any disputes in 
connection with the Treaty, or to discuss any matter relating to the interpretation or application 
of the Treaty or to the realization of the objectives of the Treaty.  
ARTICLE IX  
1. For purposes of this Treaty, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and a national 
or company of the other Party arising out of or relating to an investment authorization, an 
investment agreement or an alleged breach of any right conferred, created or recognized by this 
Treaty with respect to a covered investment.  
2. A national or company that is a party to an investment dispute may submit the dispute for 
resolution under one of the following alternatives:  
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute; or  
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-settlement procedures; or  
(c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3.  
3. (a) Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute for 
resolution under paragraph 2(a) or (b), and that three months have elapsed from the date on 
which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may submit the dispute for 
settlement by binding arbitration:  
(i) to the Centre, if the Centre is available; or  
(ii) to the Additional Facility of the Centre, if the Centre is not available; or  
(iii) in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or  
(iv) if agreed by both parties to the dispute, to any other arbitration institution or in accordance 
with any other arbitration rules.  
(b) A national or company, notwithstanding that it may have submitted a dispute to binding 
arbitration under paragraph 3(a), may seek interim injunctive relief, not involving the payment of 
damages, before the judicial or administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute, 
prior to the institution of the arbitral proceeding or during the proceeding, for the preservation of 
its rights and interests.      45 
Appendix B (cont’d) 
 
4. Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for settlement by 
binding arbitration in accordance with the choice of the national or company under paragraph 
3(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) or the mutual agreement of both parties to the dispute under paragraph 
3(a)(iv). This consent and the submission of the dispute by a national or company under 
paragraph 3(a) shall satisfy the requirement of:  
(a) Chapter II of the ICSID Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and the Additional Facility 
Rules for written consent of the parties to the dispute; and  
(b) Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958, for an "agreement in writing".  
5. Any arbitration under paragraph 3(a)(ii), (iii) or (iv) shall be held in a state that is a party to 
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
done at New York, June 10, 1958.  
6. Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on the parties to 
the dispute. Each Party shall carry out without delay the provisions of any such award and 
provide in its territory for the enforcement of such award.  
7. In any proceeding involving an investment dispute, a Party shall not assert, as a defense, 
counterclaim, right of set-off or for any other reason, that indemnification or other compensation 
for all or part of the alleged damages has been received or will be received pursuant to an 
insurance or guarantee contract.  
8. For purposes of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention and this Article, a company of a 
Party that, immediately before the occurrence of the event or events giving rise to an investment 
dispute, was a covered investment, shall be treated as a company of the other Party.  
ARTICLE X  
1. Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, that 
is not resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels, shall be submitted upon the 
request of either Party to an arbitral tribunal for binding decision in accordance with the 
applicable rules of international law. In the absence of an agreement by the Parties to the 
contrary, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules shall govern, except to the extent these rules are (a) 
modified by the Parties or (b) modified by the arbitrators unless either Party objects to the 
proposed modification.  
2. Within two months of receipt of a request, each Party shall appoint an arbitrator. The two 
arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator as Chairman, who shall be a national of a third State. The 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules applicable to appointing members of three member panels shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to the appointment of the arbitral panel except that the appointing 
authority referenced in those rules shall be the Secretary General of the Centre.  
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3. Unless otherwise agreed, all submissions shall be made and all hearings shall be completed 
within six months of the date of selection of the third arbitrator, and the arbitral panel shall 
render its decisions within two months of the date of the final submissions or the date of the 
closing of the hearings, whichever is later.  
4. Expenses incurred by the Chairman and other arbitrators, and other costs of the proceedings, 
shall be paid for equally by the Parties. However, the arbitral panel may, at its discretion, direct 
that a higher proportion of the costs be paid by one of the Parties.  
ARTICLE XI  
This Treaty shall not derogate from any of the following that entitle covered investments to 
treatment more favorable than that accorded by this Treaty:  
(a) laws and regulations, administrative practices or procedures, or administrative or adjudicatory 
decisions of a Party;  
(b) international legal obligations; or  
(c) obligations assumed by a Party, including those contained in an investment authorization or 
an investment agreement.  
ARTICLE XII  
Each Party reserves the right to deny to a company of the other Party the benefits of this Treaty if 
nationals of a third country own or control the company and  
(a) the denying Party does not maintain normal economic relations with the third country; or  
(b) the company has no substantial business activities in the territory of the Party under whose 
laws it is constituted or organized.  
  
ARTICLE XIII  
1. No provision of this Treaty shall impose obligations with respect to tax matters, except that:  
(a) Articles III, IX and X will apply with respect to expropriation; and  
(b) Article IX will apply with respect to an investment agreement or an investment authorization.  
2. A national or company, that asserts in an investment dispute that a tax matter involves an 
expropriation, may submit that dispute to arbitration pursuant to Article IX(3) only if:  
(a) the national or company concerned has first referred to the competent tax authorities of both 
Parties the issue of whether the tax matter involves an expropriation; and  
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(b) the competent tax authorities have not both determined, within nine months from the time the 
national or company referred the issue, that the matter does not involve an expropriation.  
ARTICLE XIV  
1. This Treaty shall not preclude a Party from applying measures necessary for the fulfillment of 
its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or 
the protection of its own essential security interests.  
2. This Treaty shall not preclude a Party from prescribing special formalities in connection with 
covered investments, such as a requirement that such investments be legally constituted under 
the laws and regulations of that Party, or a requirement that transfers of currency or other 
monetary instruments be reported, provided that such formalities shall not impair the substance 
of any of the rights set forth in this Treaty.  
ARTICLE XV  
1. (a) The obligations of this Treaty shall apply to the political subdivisions of the Parties.  
(b) With respect to the treatment accorded by a State, Territory or possession of the United States 
of America, national treatment means treatment no less favorable than the treatment accorded 
thereby, in like situations, to investments of nationals of the United States of America resident in, 
and companies legally constituted under the laws and regulations of, other States, Territories or 
possessions of the United States of America.  
2. A Party's obligations under this Treaty shall apply to a state enterprise in the exercise of any 
regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority delegated to it by that Party.  
ARTICLE XVI  
1. This Treaty shall enter into force thirty days after the date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification. It shall remain in force for a period of ten years and shall continue in force unless 
terminated in accordance with paragraph 2. It shall apply to covered investments existing at the 
time of entry into force as well as to those established or acquired thereafter.  
2. A Party may terminate this Treaty at the end of the initial ten year period or at any time 
thereafter by giving one year's written notice to the other Party.  
3. For ten years from the date of termination, all other Articles shall continue to apply to covered 
investments established or acquired prior to the date of termination, except insofar as those 
Articles extend to the establishment or acquisition of covered investments.  
4. The Annex [AND PROTOCOL (if any)] shall form an integral part of the Treaty.  
  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.      48 
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DONE in duplicate at [CITY] this [NUMBER] day of [MONTH], [YEAR], in the English and 
__________ languages, each text being equally authentic.  
  
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF___________________:  
  
Annex  
1. The Government of the United States of America may adopt or maintain exceptions to the 
obligation to accord national treatment to covered investments in the sectors or with respect to 
the matters specified below:  
atomic energy; custom house brokers; licenses for broadcast, common carrier, or aeronautical 
radio stations; COMSAT; subsidies or grants, including government-supported loans, guarantees 
and insurance; state and local measures exempt from Article 1102 of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement pursuant to Article 1108 thereof; landing of submarine cables.  
Most favored nation treatment shall be accorded in the sectors and matters indicated above.  
2. The Government of the United States of America may adopt or maintain exceptions to the 
obligation to accord national and most favored nation treatment to covered investments in the 
sectors or with respect to the matters specified below:  
fisheries; air and maritime transport, and related activities; banking* insurance* securities* and 
other financial services*.  
*Note: If the treaty partner undertakes acceptable commitments with respect to all or certain 
financial services, the Government of the United States of America will consider limiting these 
exceptions accordingly, so that, for example, particular obligations as to treatment would apply 
on no less favorable terms than in the North American Free Trade Agreement.  
3. The Government of ___________ may adopt or maintain exceptions...  
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, each Party agrees to accord national treatment to covered 
investments in the following sectors:  leasing of minerals or pipeline rights-of-way on 
Government lands.      49 
Appendix C:  ICRG Political Risk Rating 
“The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the political stability of the 
countries covered by ICRG on a comparable basis. This is done by assigning risk points to a pre-set group 
of factors, termed political risk components. The minimum number of points that can be assigned to each 
component is zero, while the maximum number of points depends on the fixed weight that component is 
given in the overall political risk assessment. In every case the lower the risk point total, the higher the 
risk, and the higher the risk point total the lower the risk.” 
“To ensure consistency, both between countries and over time, points are assigned by ICRG editors on the 
basis of a series of pre-set questions for each risk component.” 
ICRG Political Risk Components 
     
Component  Definition  Maximum Points 
Government Stability:  Ability to stay in office and to carry out its declared 
programs, based on measures of government unity, 
legislative strength and popular support  12 
     
Socioeconomic Conditions:  that may constrain government action:  unemployment, 
consumer confidence, poverty  12 
     
Investment Profile:  Contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, and 
payment delays  12 
     
Internal Conflict:  impact of political violence on governance:  civil 
war/terrorism/political violence, civil disorder  12 
     
External Conflict:  risk to government of external actions from non-violent 
external pressure such as trade restrictions or withholding of 
aid to violent pressure, based on war, cross-border conflict, 
foreign pressures  12 
     
Corruption:  Financial corruption such as bribes connected with licenses, 
regulation and taxes, focuses more on "actual or potential 
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, favor for favors, secret party funding, and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business. 
6 
     
Military in Politics    6 
Religious Tensions    6 
     
Law and Order:  strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular 
observance of the law  6 
     
Ethnic Tensions:  racial, nationality of language divisions  6 
Democratic Accountability    6 
Bureaucracy Quality    4 
Total    100     50 
Appendix D:  Countries included in regressions 
FDI:  Included 
Countries   
US Bilateral FDI: 
Included Countries   
Private Investment: 
Included Countries   
ALGERIA    ALGERIA    ALGERIA   
ARGENTINA    ARGENTINA    ARGENTINA    
BOLIVIA    BANGLADESH    BANGLADESH   
BRAZIL    BOLIVIA    BOLIVIA   
CAMEROON    BOTSWANA    BRAZIL    
CHILE    BRAZIL    CHILE   
COLOMBIA    CAMEROON    COLOMBIA   
COSTA RICA    CHILE    COSTA RICA   
DOMINICAN REP.   CHINA    COTE D'IVOIRE   
ECUADOR    COLOMBIA    DOMINICAN REPUBLIC    
EGYPT    COSTA RICA    ECUADOR    
EL SALVADOR    DOMINICAN REPUBLIC   EGYPT    
GAMBIA    ECUADOR    EL SALVADOR   
GHANA    EGYPT    GUATEMALA    
GUATEMALA    EL SALVADOR    GUINEA-BISSAU    
GUYANA    GHANA    GUYANA    
HAITI    GUATEMALA    HAITI    
HONDURAS    GUYANA    INDIA   
INDIA    HAITI    INDONESIA    
INDONESIA    HONDURAS    IRAN   
IRAN    HUNGARY    KENYA    
JAMAICA    INDIA    MADAGASCAR    
KENYA    INDONESIA    MALAWI    
MALAWI    IRAN    MALAYSIA    
MALAYSIA    KENYA    MEXICO    
MEXICO    MALAYSIA    MOROCCO    
NICARAGUA    MALI    NICARAGUA    
NIGER    MEXICO    PAKISTAN    
PAKISTAN    NICARAGUA    PANAMA    
PANAMA    NIGER    PAPUA NEW GUINEA    
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  PAKISTAN    PARAGUAY    
PARAGUAY    PANAMA    PERU    
PERU    PAPUA NEW GUINEA    PHILIPPINES    
PHILIPPINES    PARAGUAY    SOUTH AFRICA    
SENEGAL    PERU    THAILAND    
SIERRA LEONE    PHILIPPINES    TRINIDAD & TOBAGO    
SOUTH AFRICA    SENEGAL    TUNISIA    
SRI LANKA    SOUTH AFRICA    TURKEY    
SYRIA    SRI LANKA    URUGUAY    
THAILAND    THAILAND    VENEZUELA    
TOGO    TOGO        
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO  TRINIDAD & TOBAGO        
URUGUAY    TUNISIA        
VENEZUELA    TURKEY        
ZIMBABWE    URUGUAY        
    VENEZUELA        
    ZAMBIA        
    ZIMBABWE       
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Property Rights:  
Included Countries      
ALGERIA  PARAGUAY 
ARGENTINA  PERU   
BAHRAIN  PHILIPPINES 
BANGLADESH  SAUDI ARABIA 
BOLIVIA  SENEGAL 
BOTSWANA  SIERRA LEONE 
BRAZIL  SOUTH AFRICA 
BURKINA FASO  SRI LANKA 
CAMEROON  SURINAME 
CHILE   SYRIA   
CHINA  THAILAND 
COLOMBIA  TOGO   
CONGO  TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 
COSTA RICA  TUNISIA   
COTE D'IVOIRE  TURKEY   
DOMINICAN REP.  UGANDA   
ECUADOR  URUGUAY 
EGYPT  VENEZUELA 
EL SALVADOR  ZAMBIA   
ETHIOPIA  ZIMBABWE 
GABON     
GAMBIA     
GHANA     
GUATEMALA   
GUINEA-BISSAU   
GUYANA     
HAITI     
HONDURAS   
HUNGARY   
INDIA     
INDONESIA   
IRAN     
JAMAICA     
JORDAN      
KENYA     
MADAGASCAR    
MALAWI     
MALAYSIA   
MALI      
MEXICO     
MOROCCO   
NICARAGUA   
NIGER     
NIGERIA     
OMAN     
PAKISTAN   
PANAMA     
PAPUA NEW GUINEA       52 
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Description of variables 
  Variable Name  Description and Source 
    
Dependent Variables   
 
Measures the total US dollar amounts of foreign direct investment 
flowing into a country each year, divided by the total amount of World 
FDI inflows that year. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Source:  UNCTAD database on FDI 
    
 
The difference between total gross domestic investment(from national 
accounts) and consolidated public investment. 
 
Private Domestic Investment 
Source:  World Development Indicators 
    
 
Measured as the sum of three indicators from the ICRG's political risk 
scale:  Investment profile: the sum of the investment profile (measure of 
the risk of expropriation and contract viability), law and order and 
corruption.  Scale is out of a total possible of 24. 
 
Property Rights 
source:  International Country Risk Guide 
    
Independent Variables   
 
Equal to the number of treaties signed with high-income countries for a 
particular year. 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, with 
developed countries 
Source:  UNCTAD database on bilateral investment treaties. 
    
 
Equal to the number of treaties signed with developing countries for a 
particular year.   
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, with 
developing countries 
Source:  UNCTAD database on bilateral investment treaties. 
 
   
 
Political Risk  Assessment of the “political stability of the countries covered by ICRG 
on a comparable basis”, by assigning risk points to a pre- set group of 
risk components. The minimum number of points assigned to each 
component is zero, while the maximum number of points is a function 
of the components weight in the overall political risk assessment. The 
risk components (and maximum points) are: Government stability (e. g., 
popular support) (12), Socioeconomic conditions (e. g., poverty) (12), 
Investment profile (e. g., expropriation) (12), Internal conflict (e. g., 
terrorism or civil war) (12), External conflict (e. g., war) (12), 
Corruption (6), Military in politics (6), Religion in politics (6), Law and 
order (6), Ethnic tensions (6), Democratic accountability (6) and 
Bureaucracy Quality (4). Scale from zero to 100; low scores indicate 
high political risk. 
   source:  International Country Risk Guide     53 
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   Variable Name  Description and Source 
 
Logarithm of GNP per capita expressed in current U.S. dollars for the 
period 1970-1995.   
 
Log GNP Per Capita 
Source: WDI. 
    
 
Growth  Growth rate of per capita GDP, measured as the percent change per 
year in GDP 
     Source:  World Development Indicators. 
    
 
The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values 
between 0 and 1.   
 
Latitude 
Source: CIA 1996. 
    
 
Dummy variables by continent for Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe.  Variables equal 1 if country is located on that 
continent. 
 
Continent 
Source:  CIA 1996. 
    
 
Natural Resources  Measures total US dollar amounts of natural fuels and ores exported 
from individual countries.                             
    Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database. 
    
 
Liquid Liabilities  Defined by the World Development Indicators as “the sum of currency 
and deposits in the central bank, plus transferable deposits and 
electronic currency, plus time and savings deposits, foreign currency 
transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase 
agreements, plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, 
commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by 
residents.”  Measured as a percent of GDP        
    Source:Levine-Loayza-Beck Dataset, World Bank 
    
 
Black Market Premium  Ratio of black market exchange rate and official exchange rate minus 
one.                   
 
  Source:Levine-Loayza-Beck Dataset, World Bank 
 
   
 
Inflation  Inflation rates are calculated using average annual CPI data.                                  
Source:  International Financial Statistics 
    
 
Population  Total population in millions in a country each year.                                    
Source:  World Development Indicators. 
    
 
Socio-economic indicator  Rating of socio-economic conditions in a country such as poverty levels 
and unemployment as part of the political risk measure. 
   Source:  ICRG     54 
Appendix F 
Summary Statistics:  FDI Regressions 
           
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
FDI  128  0.27  0.58  -0.16  3.61 
Hi Income BITs  128  1.95  2.90  0  13 
Low Income BITs  128  0.58  1.35  0  8 
Cumulative Total BITs  128  2.5  4  0  21 
Ln GDP per capita  128  7.03  0.92  4.98  8.96 
Political Risk  128  51.29  10.64  26  77 
GDP growth  128  4.38  4.01  0  22.17 
Black Market Premium  128  1.90  10.11  -0.04  109.91 
Natural Resources  128  24.83  28.52  0  98.61 
Latitude Abstract  128  0.18  0.10  0.01  0.39 
Ln Population  128  16.4  1.42  13.5  20.6 
           
           
           
Summary Statistics:  Private Investment Regressions 
           
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Private Investment  142  13.50  4.78  3.06  32.50 
Hi Income BITs  142  3.38  4.11  0  17 
Low Income BITs  142  2.33  5.07  0  28 
Cumulative Total BITs  142  5.71  8.64  0  43 
Ln GDP per capita  142  7.09  0.95  4.90  8.86 
Political Risk  142  54.69  11.30  26  77 
GDP growth  142  4.07  2.55  -2.37  10.28 
Liquid Liabilities  142  34.53  16.57  0.57  90.01 
Natural Resources  142  21.04  26.14  0  97.12 
Latitude Abstract  142  0.20  0.12  0.01  0.43 
           
           
           
Summary Statistics:  Property Rights Regression 
           
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Property Rights  255  11.31  2.76  3  18.60 
Cumulative Total BITs  255  9.16  13.96  0  94 
Hi Income BITs  255  4.61  4.95  0  24 
Low Income BITs  255  4.55  9.71  0  70 
GDP growth  255  4.43  4.22  0  25.01 
Ln GDP per capita  255  6.98  1.07  4.51  9.36 
Natural Resources  255  22.69  27.53  0  98.61 
Socio-economic Indicator  255  5.34  1.33  1.40  9 
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  Correlations: Property Rights 
  
Property 
Rights  Total BITs 
Hi income 
BITs 
Low Income 
BITs 
GDP 
Growth 
Log GDP 
per capita  Time 
Natural 
Resources  Inflation 
Socio-econ. 
Indicator 
Property Rights  1.00                   
Total BITs  0.25  1.00                 
Hi income BITs  0.22  0.93  1.00               
Low Income BITs  0.25  0.97  0.81  1.00             
GDP Growth  0.00  0.05  0.05  0.04  1.00           
Log GDP per capita  0.40  0.16  0.12  0.16  0.08  1.00         
Time  0.35  0.30  0.31  0.28  0.18  0.15  1.00       
Natural Resources  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.27  -0.03  1.00     
Inflation  -0.08  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.10  0.02  -0.06  0.03  1.00   
Socio-econ. Indicator  0.44  0.17  0.18  0.15  0.06  0.33  -0.30  0.11  -0.09  1.00 
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  Correlations between Variables:  Private Investment 
  
Private 
Investment 
Hi 
income 
BITs 
Low 
Income 
BITs 
Total 
BITs 
Log GDP 
per capita 
Political 
Risk 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Liquid 
Liabilities Time  Inflation 
Taxes 
on 
goods 
Natural 
Resources 
Latitude 
Abstract 
Eastern 
Europe, 
FSU 
Latin 
America/Car Africa 
Private 
Investment  1                              
Hi income BITs  0.13  1.00                            
Low Income BITs  0.06  0.81  1.00                          
Total BITs  0.10  0.93  0.97  1.00                        
Log GDP per 
capita  0.37  0.05  0.08  0.07  1.00                      
Political Risk  0.24  0.43  0.35  0.40  0.40  1.00                    
GDP Growth Rate  0.21  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.05  1.00                  
Liquid 
Liabilities  0.24  0.04  0.10  0.08  0.37  0.10  -0.02  1.00                
Time  0.18  0.52  0.40  0.47  0.00  0.43  0.05  -0.01  1.00              
Inflation  -0.04  -0.05  -0.03  -0.04  -0.01  -0.08  -0.19  -0.05 -0.06  1.00            
Taxes on goods  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.07  -0.01  0.04  -0.16  -0.05  0.00  0.09  1.00          
Natural 
Resources  -0.04  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.25  0.03  -0.01  0.05 -0.03  0.03  -0.12  1.00        
Latitude 
Abstract  -0.12  0.10  0.19  0.16  0.24  0.11  0.01  0.28  0.00  -0.02  0.10  0.05  1.00      
Eastern Europe, 
FSU  -0.01  0.13  0.12  0.13  0.25  0.27  -0.25  0.03  0.00  0.14  0.23  -0.05  0.31  1.00    
Latin 
America/Car  0.03  -0.07  -0.06  -0.07  0.36  0.07  -0.01  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.16  0.04  -0.11  -0.23  1.00  
Africa  -0.24  -0.08  -0.16  -0.14  -0.50  -0.21  0.01  -0.36  0.00  -0.02  -0.19  -0.15  -0.36  -0.30  -0.37  
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FDI/ 
World 
FDI 
Hi 
income 
BITs 
Low 
Income 
BITs 
Total 
BITs 
Log GDP 
per 
capita 
Political 
Risk 
GDP 
Growth 
Black 
Market 
Premium Oppenness 
Natural 
Resources Time 
Latitude 
Abstract 
Civil 
Legal 
Origin 
Latin 
America/
Car  Africa 
FDI/World 
FDI  1.00                            
Hi income 
BITs  0.16  1.00                          
Low Income 
BITs  0.20  0.81  1.00                        
Total BITs  0.19  0.93  0.97  1.00                      
Log GDP per 
capita  0.13  0.08  0.15  0.13  1.00                    
Political 
Risk  0.29  0.43  0.35  0.40  0.44  1.00                  
GDP Growth  0.08  0.08  0.05  0.06  0.08  -0.06  1.00                
Black 
Market 
Premium  -0.05  -0.06  -0.03  -0.05  -0.05  -0.16  -0.01  1.00              
Oppenness  -0.16  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.30  0.23  -0.01  -0.02  1.00            
Natural 
Resources  0.03  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.27  0.03  0.09  -0.04  0.08  1.00          
Time  0.02  0.52  0.40  0.47  0.15  0.43  0.18  0.06  0.18  -0.03  1.00        
Latitude 
Abstract  0.08  0.10  0.19  0.16  0.21  0.11  0.03  -0.01  -0.10  0.05  0.00  1.00      
Civil Legal 
Origin  -0.01  0.09  0.02  0.05  0.10  -0.01  -0.01  0.05  -0.32  0.13  0.00  -0.03  1.00    
Latin 
America/Car  0.10  -0.07  -0.06  -0.07  0.42  0.07  0.02  0.03  -0.03  0.04  0.00  -0.11  0.18  1.00  
Africa  -0.15  -0.08  -0.16  -0.14  -0.45  -0.21  0.02  -0.06  -0.05  -0.15  0.00  -0.36  0.00  -0.37  1.00 
Total 
Population  0.40  0.16  0.21  0.20  -0.19  0.04  0.12  0.00  -0.23  -0.05  0.06  0.18  -0.16  -0.08  -0.12 
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Country  Date of Signature 
Rank of Country in FDI 
inflows out of all developing 
countries at year of signing 
the treaty 
Number of countries 
ahead in ranking 
without treaty in place 
Panama  27-Oct-82  6  5 
Senegal  6-Dec-83  24  22 
Haiti  13-Dec-83  64  62 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
3-Aug-84 
77  74 
Morocco  22-Jul-85  36  33 
Turkey  3-Dec-85  19  18 
Cameroon  26-Feb-86  99  91 
Egypt  11-Mar-86  80  72 
Bangladesh  12-Mar-86  50  45 
Grenada  2-May-86  39  35 
Poland  21-Mar-90  47  40 
Tunisia  15-May-90  35  30 
Sri Lanka  20-Sep-91  49  38 
Czech Republic  22-Oct-91  112  97 
Slovakia  22-Oct-91  135  119 
Argentina  14-Nov-91  8  6 
Kazakhstan  19-May-92  122  102 
Romania  28-May-92  36  28 
Russia  17-Jun-92  33  27 
Armenia  23-Sep-92  97  81 
Bulgaria  23-Sep-92  53  42 
Ecuador  27-Aug-93  16  12 
Belarus  15-Jan-94  73  53 
Jamaica  4-Feb-94  21  16 
Ukraine  4-Mar-94  137  109 
Georgia  7-Mar-94  79  58 
Estonia  19-Apr-94  113  87 
Trinidad & Tobago 26-Sep-94  28  20 
Mongolia  6-Oct-94  126  98 
Uzbekistan  16-Dec-94  140  111 
Albania  11-Jan-95  74  55 
Latvia  13-Jan-95  118  88 
Honduras  1-Jul-95  84  61 
Nicaragua  1-Jul-95  126  95 
Croatia  13-Jul-96  112  82 
Jordan  2-Jul-97  120  86 
Azerbaijan  1-Aug-97  13  11 
Lithuania  14-Jan-98  80  53 
Bolivia  17-Apr-98  32  20 
Mozambique  1-Dec-98  58  36 
El Salvador  10-Mar-99  23  13     59 
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